Susceptibility to Manipulation by Sincere Truncation : the Case of Scoring Rules and Scoring Runoff Systems

Abstract : A voting rule is said to be vulnerable to the truncation paradox if some voter may favor the election of a more preferable outcome by listing only part of his sincere ranking on the competing candidates than listing his entire preference ranking on all the competing candidates (Brams, 1982, Fishburn and Brams, 1983). For three-candidate elections and for large electorates, this paper provides under the Impartial Anonymous Culture assumption (IAC), an evaluation of the likelihood of the truncation paradox the whole family of the scoring rules and runoff scoring rules.
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Submitted on : Wednesday, November 13, 2019 - 4:09:14 PM
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Eric Kamwa, Issofa Moyouwou. Susceptibility to Manipulation by Sincere Truncation : the Case of Scoring Rules and Scoring Runoff Systems. Diss M.; Merlin V. Evaluating Voting Systems with Probability Models, Essays by and in honor of William Gehrlein and Dominique Lepelley, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, In press, Studies in Choice and Welfare. ⟨hal-02185965v2⟩

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