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Susceptibility to Manipulation by Sincere Truncation : the Case of Scoring Rules and Scoring Runoff Systems

Eric Kamwa and Issouf Moyouwou

Abstract A voting rule is said to be vulnerable to the truncation paradox if some voter may favor the election of a more preferable outcome by listing only part of his sincere ranking on the competing candidates than listing his entire preference ranking on all the competing candidates (Brams, 1982, Fishburn and Brams, 1983). For three-candidate elections and for large electorates, this paper provides under the Impartial Anonymous Culture assumption (IAC), an evaluation of the likelihood of the truncation paradox the whole family of the scoring rules and runoff scoring rules.

1 Introduction

During an election or a referendum, some people may choose not to vote. In case of a high level of abstention, the legitimacy of the results of an election may be challenged. The motivations of an abstainer may be dictated by various considerations among which strategic behavior plays a central role. It is known since Doron and Kronick (1977) and Fishburn and Brams (1983) that a voter may have better to abstain than to vote since abstaining may result in the victory of a more preferable or desirable candidate. This counterintuitive voting event is known in the literature as the *No-Show paradox*. Following Nurmi (1999), Felsenthal (2012), the few exceptions of voting rules that are not vulnerable to the No-Show paradox include the *Plurality rule*, the *Borda rule* and the *Approval voting*.¹ According to Smith (1973), all the scoring

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¹ Under the *Plurality rule*, every voter casts one vote for only one candidate and the one with the most number of votes wins. With $m \geq 3$ candidates, the Borda rule gives $m - j$ points to a candidate

runoff systems are sensitive to the No-show paradox. With at least four candidates, Moulin (1988) showed that all the Condorcet consistent rules are vulnerable to the No-Show paradox; see also Brandt et al. (2018), Duddy (2013) and Jimeno et al. (2009). A *Condorcet consistent* voting rule always elects the Condorcet winner when she exists. A *Condorcet winner* is a candidate that beats all the others in pairwise majority contests.

For voting situations with three candidates, Lepelley and Merlin (2001) computed the likelihood of the No-show paradox for three well-known scoring runoff rules; they concluded that when the electorate tends to infinity, the likelihood² of the No-show paradox is equal to 2.14% for the Borda runoff, 5.40% for the Plurality runoff and 4.25% for the Antiplurality runoff.³ For their own, Kamwa et al. (2018) analyzed the No-show paradox for three-candidate elections with single-peaked preferences. They found what follows: *i*) in three-candidate elections with single-peaked preferences, all the scoring runoff rules between the Borda runoff and the Antiplurality runoff are not sensitive to the No-show paradox; *ii*) single-peakedness of preferences considerably reduces the likelihood of the No-show paradox which remains considerable.

This is perhaps to counter the behavior of abstention that several states (for instance, Bolivia, Belgium, Luxembourg and Romania) have decided to render voting compulsory. Notwithstanding compulsory voting, some voters may manipulate the vote by using a weak version of the abstention behavior called the “*sincere truncation*”. The *sincere truncation* of preferences also called the *truncation paradox*, was first introduced in the social choice literature by Brams (1982). Let us assume a group of voters who are asked to rank (sincerely) a list of candidates from the most preferred to the least preferred and that voters are allowed to submit incomplete rankings; all the candidates not ranked or listed on a ballot are assumed to be less preferred than all those who are ranked (Fishburn and Brams, 1983, 1984). A voting rule is said to be vulnerable to the sincere truncation if there are some configurations of ballots such that there is at least one voter who prefers the outcome obtained when he submits a sincere but incomplete ranking (truncated ranking) to the outcome obtained when he casts a complete sincere ranking.

A voting rule that is vulnerable to the No-Show paradox is also vulnerable to the truncation paradox but the reverse is not necessary true (see Nurmi, 1999). Almost all the well-known voting rules are vulnerable to the truncation paradox. As a consequence of Moulin’s theorem, Fishburn and Brams (1984, p.402) showed that all the Condorcet consistent rule are sensitive to the truncation paradox. In order to have a non-exhaustive list of the voting rules vulnerable to the truncation paradox, the reader may refer to Felsenthal (2012), Nurmi (1999) and Fishburn and Brams (1984). The few exceptions are the *Plurality rule*, the *Plurality runoff* and the *Approval voting*.

each time, he is ranked j -th in a voter’s ranking; the winner is the candidate with the largest total number of points. Under the *Approval voting*, each voter can approve many candidates as he wants. The winner is the candidate with the most number of approvals.

² Under the impartial and anonymous culture (defined later).

³ The Plurality runoff, the Borda runoff and the Antiplurality runoff will be defined later.

Is the truncation paradox a rare oddity or a generalized behavior? To our knowledge, the only work that tried to evaluate the likelihood of the truncation paradox is that of Plassmann and Tideman (1999); for three-candidate elections they focused on some voting rules amongst others some Condorcet consistent rules, some scoring rules (Borda, Antipluralism) and some iterative scoring rules (iterative Plurality, iterative Antipluralism). They based their calculations on the spatial model for drawing voting situations. In this paper, we do the same job for the whole family of scoring rules and scoring runoff rules in three-candidate elections both under the universal and the single-peaked domains. So, we characterize all the paradoxical situations and then compute the exact likelihood of the paradox. We perform our analysis under the assumption of Impartial Anonymous Culture (IAC) which is one of the well-known assumptions often used for such a study. Under IAC, first introduced by Kuga and Hiroaki (1974) and later developed by Gehrlein and Fishburn (1976), each voting situation is assumed to be equally likely to occur. The likelihood of a given event is calculated with respect to the ratio between the number of voting situations in which the event is likely over the total number of possible voting situations. The number of voting situations associated with a given event can be reduced to the solutions of a finite system of linear constraints with rational coefficients. As recently pointed out in the social choice literature, the appropriate mathematical tools to find these solutions are the Ehrhart polynomials. The background of this notion and its connection with the polytope theory can be found in Gehrlein and Lepelley (2017, 2011) and Lepelley et al. (2008). This technique has been widely used in numerous studies analyzing the probability of electoral events in the case of three-candidate elections under the IAC assumption. In this paper, we will follow the technique initiated by Cervone et al. (2005) for our computations. We will say some few words on this technique in the appendices.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 is devoted to basic definitions. In Section 3, given a three-candidate election where voters have strict rankings, we characterize for all the one-shot and runoff scoring rule, all the voting situations vulnerable to the truncation paradox and then we compute the limiting probabilities. We do the same job in Section 4 by assuming that voters' preferences are single-peaked. Section 5 concludes.

2 Notation and definitions

2.1 Preferences

Let N be a set of n voters ($n \geq 2$) and A a set of m candidates ($m \geq 3$). Individual preferences are linear orders, these are complete, asymmetric and transitive binary relations on A . With m candidates, there are exactly $m!$ linear orders $P_1, P_2, \dots, P_{m!}$ on A . A *voting situation* is an $m!$ -tuple $\pi = (n_1, n_2, \dots, n_t, \dots, n_{m!})$ that indicates the total number n_t of voters casting each complete linear order $P_t, t = 1, 2, \dots, m!$ in such a way that $\sum_{t=1}^{m!} n_t = n$. In the sequel, we consider three candidates a, b and

c . In this case, we will simply write abc to denote the linear order on A according to which a is strictly preferred to b , b is strictly preferred to c ; and by transitivity a is strictly preferred to c . Table 1 describes a voting situation with three candidates: there are six preference types and for $t = 1, 2, \dots, 6$, n_t is the total number of voters of type t .

Table 1 Voting situation and possible preferences types with three candidates

type 1: abc (n_1) type 3: bac (n_3) type 5: cab (n_5)

type 2: acb (n_2) type 4: bca (n_4) type 6: cba (n_6)

Given $a, b \in A$ and a voting situation π , we denote by $n_{ab}(\pi)$ (simply n_{ab}) the total number of voters who rank strictly prefer a to b . If $n_{ab} > n_{ba}$, we say that a majority dominates candidate b ; or equivalently, a beats b in a pairwise majority voting. In such a case, we will simply write $aM(\pi)b$. Similarly, $n_{abc}(\pi)$ is the total number of voters in π who rank a first, b second and c last at π .

Possible actions of a voter include (i) *ranking all candidates* from the top ranked candidate to the least preferred one; (ii) *abstaining*: no ranking is provided; or, (iii) *truncating*: the voter submits an incomplete rankings. It is assumed that all the candidates not ranked on a ballot are less preferred to all those who are ranked. With three candidates, when a voter truncates, he just states his most preferred candidate. For example with Table 1, if some voters of type 1 truncate, this leads to a new voting situation π' in which these voters only state a – as their ranking. Note that when some voters truncate, this does not alter the size of the electorate as it is the case when some voters abstain.

2.2 Voting rules

Scoring rules are voting systems that give points to candidates according to the position they have in voters' ranking. For a given scoring rule, the total number of points received by a candidate defines her score for this rule. The winner is the candidate with the highest score. In general, with $m \geq 3$ and complete strict rankings, a scoring vector is an m -tuple $w = (w_1, w_2, \dots, w_k, \dots, w_m)$ of real numbers such that $w_1 \geq w_2 \geq \dots \geq w_k \geq \dots \geq w_m$ and $w_1 > w_m$. Given a voting situation π , each candidate receives w_k each time she is ranked k^{th} by a voter. The score of a candidate $x \in A$ is the sum $S(\pi, w, x) = \sum_{t=1}^{m!} n_t w_{r(t,x)}$ where $r(t, x)$ is the rank of candidate x according to voters of type t .

For uniqueness, we use the normalized form $(1, \frac{w_2 - w_m}{w_1 - w_m}, \dots, \frac{w_k - w_m}{w_1 - w_m}, \dots, 0)$ of each scoring vector w . With three candidates, a normalized scoring vector has the shape $w_\lambda = (1, \lambda, 0)$ with $0 \leq \lambda \leq 1$. For $\lambda = 0$, we obtain the *Plurality rule*; for $\lambda = 1$, we have the *Anti-plurality rule* and for $\lambda = \frac{1}{2}$, we get the *Borda rule*. From now on, we will denote by $S(\pi, \lambda, x)$, the score of candidate x when the scoring vector is

$w_\lambda = (1, \lambda, 0)$ and the voting situation is π . Table 2 gives the score of each candidate in $A = \{a, b, c\}$ given the voting situation of Table 1.

Table 2 Scores with three candidates

$$\begin{array}{l} \overline{S(\pi, \lambda, a) = n_1 + n_2 + \lambda(n_3 + n_5)} \\ \overline{S(\pi, \lambda, b) = n_3 + n_4 + \lambda(n_1 + n_6)} \\ \overline{S(\pi, \lambda, c) = n_5 + n_6 + \lambda(n_2 + n_4)} \end{array}$$

In one shot voting, the winner is just the candidate with the largest score. Runoff systems involve two rounds of voting: at the *first round*, the candidate with the smallest score is eliminated; at the *second round*, a majority contest determines who is the winner.

With three candidates, when a voter of type 1 with the ranking abc truncates and submits $a - -$, candidate a receives 1 point in the new voting situation while both b and c receive zero point. Similar considerations are made for other types. Note that when some voters truncate their preferences, only the scores of candidates ranked second by some of these voters are affected and diminish. Moreover, truncation is only reachable at the first round under runoff systems.

Ties among candidates will be broken alphabetically, e.g. a wins all ties against other candidates; while b wins all ties against c . Note that this special tie-breaking rule does not affect our results as we only deal with voting situations where the total number of voters tends to infinity. Let us now illustrate the truncation paradox for the voting rules under consideration scoring in a three-candidate election.

2.3 Illustrating the truncation paradox

As stated above, among the scoring and the scoring runoff rules we focus on, only the Plurality rule and the Plurality runoff are not vulnerable to the truncation paradox. So, in our analysis of three-candidate elections, we will focus on $\lambda \in]0, 1]$. Now consider the following sincere voting situation π with three candidates and 45 voters:

$$11 : abc \quad 4 : acb \quad 7 : bac \quad 8 : bca \quad 10 : cab \quad 5 : cba$$

According to Table 2, the scores are the following:

$$S(\pi, \lambda, a) = 15 + 17\lambda; \quad S(\pi, \lambda, b) = 15 + 16\lambda; \quad S(\pi, \lambda, c) = 15 + 12\lambda$$

It comes that for all $\lambda \in]0, 1]$, we get $S(\pi, \lambda, a) > S(\pi, \lambda, b) > S(\pi, \lambda, c)$.

- *The case of one-shot scoring rules.*

As $S(\pi, \lambda, a) > S(\pi, \lambda, b) > S(\pi, \lambda, c)$ for all $\lambda \in]0, 1]$, candidate a is the winner. Assume that two voters with bac (type 3) truncate. Then, the new scores are:

$$S(\pi', \lambda, a) = 15 + 15\lambda; \quad S(\pi', \lambda, b) = S(\pi, \lambda, b) = 15 + 16\lambda; \quad S(\pi', \lambda, c) = S(\pi, \lambda, c) = 15 + 12\lambda$$

Candidate a is no longer the winner since $S(\pi', \lambda, b) > S(\pi', \lambda, a) > S(\pi', \lambda, c)$; the new winner is candidate b . Since the two voters of type 3 benefit from the truncation, the truncation paradox can occur for all $\lambda \in]0, 1]$.

- *The case of runoff scoring rules.*

Given that $S(\pi, \lambda, a) > S(\pi, \lambda, b) > S(\pi, \lambda, c)$, candidate c is eliminated at the first round. At the second round, candidate a wins with $n_{ab} = 25$ favorable votes against $n_{ba} = 20$ votes in favor of b .

Assume that all the 5 voters with cba (type 6) truncate: they just state $c - -$. In this case, the new scores are:

$$S(\pi', \lambda, a) = 15 + 17\lambda; \quad S(\pi', \lambda, b) = 15 + 11\lambda; \quad S(\pi', \lambda, c) = 15 + 12\lambda$$

For all $\lambda \in]0, 1]$, we get $S(\pi', \lambda, a) > S(\pi', \lambda, c) > S(\pi', \lambda, b)$: candidate b is eliminated at the first round. Since $n_{ac} = 22$ and $n_{ca} = 23$, c wins the second round. So, by truncating their true preferences, the five voters of type 6 obtain a better outcome: the truncation paradox occurs.

3 The vulnerability of scoring runoff rules to the truncation paradox in three-candidate elections

Prior to the determination of the likelihood of the truncation paradox, we need to characterize all the voting situations under which this paradox is susceptible to occur.

3.1 The case of one-shot scoring rules

Consider a voting situation $\pi = (n_1, n_2, n_3, n_4, n_5, n_6)$ on $A = \{a, b, c\}$ and the one-shot rule with $0 < \lambda \leq 1$. Let $\pi([R_{j_1}, R_{j_2}, \dots])$ stands for the voting situation obtained from π when all type R_{j_1}, R_{j_2}, \dots voters truncate their preferences. For example, $\pi[abc]$ differs from π only on the fact that at $\pi[abc]$, candidate a receives 1 point from each type 1 voter while the two other receive 0 point. Similarly, from π to $\pi[abc, acb]$ the only change that occurs is that all type 1 voters and all type 2 voters now truncate their preferences to report a ... For one-shot scoring rules, the following result identifies all voting situations at which the truncation paradox is possible.

Proposition 1 *Consider a voting situation $\pi = (n_1, n_2, n_3, n_4, n_5, n_6)$ on $A = \{a, b, c\}$, the one-shot rule associated with $0 < \lambda \leq 1$ and a pair $\{x, y\}$ of candidates with $A \setminus \{x, y\} = z$.*

If x is the election winner at π , then the truncation paradox is susceptible to occur at π in favor of y if and only if y is the election winner at $\pi([yxz, yzx])$.

Proof See Appendix A. \square

Remark 1 Given a voting situation with three candidates, only voters having the same top-ranked candidate can effectively benefit from truncating preferences by truly reporting their best candidate. For example, if a is the winning outcome, it appears from Proposition 1 that truncating preferences may benefit either voters of type 3 and type 4 with bac and bca respectively; or else voters of type 5 and type 6 with the orderings cab and cba respectively. This is in contrast with other strategic misrepresentations of preferences which allow successful coordination among voters who may report fake ranking with possibly a false best candidate - see Lepelley and Mbih (1994), Pritchard and Wilson (2007) or Mbih et al. (2009).

Proposition 2 Consider a one-shot scoring rule F_λ , $0 < \lambda \leq 1$. As the total number n of voters tends to infinity, the limit probability of observing a voting situation at which the truncation paradox may occur is given by :

If $0 < \lambda \leq \frac{1}{2}$, $P(F_\lambda, TP, IAC) =$


$$\frac{(10\lambda^{13} - 37\lambda^{12} - 179\lambda^{11} + 1310\lambda^{10} - 1778\lambda^9 - 6319\lambda^8 + 26773\lambda^7 - 25735\lambda^6 - 67880\lambda^5 + 259941\lambda^4 - 408078\lambda^3 + 356643\lambda^2 - 166536\lambda + 31833)\lambda}{6(3+\lambda)^2(3-2\lambda+\lambda^2)^2(\lambda-2)^2(2\lambda-3)^2(\lambda-1)(-3+5\lambda)}$$

If $\frac{1}{2} \leq \lambda \leq 1$, $P(F_\lambda, TP, IAC) =$

$$\frac{2\lambda^{13} + 50\lambda^{12} - 194\lambda^{11} - 190\lambda^{10} + 2548\lambda^9 - 5560\lambda^8 - 662\lambda^7 + 26915\lambda^6 - 62174\lambda^5 + 73636\lambda^4 - 48132\lambda^3 + 16425\lambda^2 - 3564\lambda + 324}{12(3+\lambda)^2(3-2\lambda+\lambda^2)^2(\lambda-2)^2\lambda^2(2\lambda-3)}$$

Proof See Appendix B for details on computations. \square

As the total number n of voters tends to infinity, it appears from Proposition 2, that the limit probability of observing, under the IAC assumption, a voting situation at which the truncation paradox may occur given a one-shot scoring rule F_λ increases from 0 to $\frac{3}{4}$ as the weight λ increases from 0 (the plurality rule) to 1 (the negative plurality rule); for an overview of the behavior of $P(F_\lambda, TP, IAC)$, see Figure 1 or Table 3 where we report some numerical evaluations.

Fig. 1 Vulnerability of scoring rules to the truncation paradox**Table 3** Values of $P(F_\lambda, TP, IAC)$ and $P(F'_\lambda, TP, IAC)$

λ	0	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.9	1
$P(F_\lambda, TP, IAC)$	0	0.06334	0.1322	0.2067	0.2866	0.3710	0.4575	0.5423	0.6215	0.6916	0.7500
$P(F'_\lambda, TP, IAC)$	0	0.04998	0.1032	0.1593	0.2172	0.2750	0.3300	0.3806	0.4257	0.4652	0.5000

3.2 The case of scoring runoff rules

Consider the voting situation $\pi = (n_1, n_2, n_3, n_4, n_5, n_6)$ and a runoff rule with $0 < \lambda \leq 1$. Assume that at π , z is eliminated at the first round and that x wins against y at the second round. For simplicity, we say that x is the winner, y is the challenger and z is the (first-round) loser. To see how the truncation paradox arises under a runoff rule, recall that this paradox can be seen as a strategic behavior by some voters. Taking into the account the specificity of runoff rules that combine both counting points at the first round and majority voting at the second round, successful truncations of preferences are either (i) in favor of the challenger when some voters by truncating their rankings now make x losing at the first round and the loser being beating by the challenger at the second round; or (ii) in favor of the loser who defeats the winner or the challenger in the second round.

Proposition 3 Consider a voting situation $\pi = (n_1, n_2, n_3, n_4, n_5, n_6)$ on $A = \{a, b, c\}$ and a runoff rule with $0 < \lambda \leq 1$. Assume that x is the winner, y is the challenger and z is the first-round loser.

1. The truncation paradox is susceptible to occur at π in favor of y if and only if y wins the majority duel against z and x is the first-round loser at $\pi([y x z])$.
2. The truncation paradox is susceptible to occur at π in favor of z if and only if (z wins the majority duel against y and x is the first-round loser at $\pi([z x y])$); or (z wins the majority duel against x and y is the first-round loser at $\pi([z y x])$).

Proof See Appendix C. \square

In contrast with one-shot scoring rules, when the truncation paradox occurs under a run-off rule with three candidates, it is always reachable by a coalition of voters of the same type. As above, Proposition completely describes all the possible scenarios that support possible occurrence of the truncation paradox given a voting situation. These conditions lead us to some sets of linear constraints that characterize all possible occurrences of the truncation paradox under a runoff rule. All those details are available in Appendix D. Computing the volume of all the corresponding polytopes give the following results :

Proposition 4 Consider the scoring runoff rule F'_λ associated with the scoring vector $w_\lambda = (1, \lambda, 0)$ with $0 < \lambda \leq 1$. As the total number n of voters tends to infinity, the limit probability $P(F'_\lambda, TP, IAC)$ of observing a voting situation at which the truncation paradox may occur is given by :

If $0 \leq \lambda \leq \frac{1}{2}$, $P(F'_\lambda, TP, IAC) =$

$$\begin{aligned} & - \frac{\lambda(996\,096\lambda^{19} - 25\,010\,368\lambda^{18} + 286\,101\,152\lambda^{17} - 2000\,804\,220\lambda^{16} + 9664\,972\,152\lambda^{15} - 34\,453\,144\,125\lambda^{14} + 94\,322\,255\,778\lambda^{13})}{96(\lambda-1)^2(\lambda-2)^2(2\lambda-3)^2(4\lambda-3)^2(5\lambda-3)^2(-2\lambda+\lambda^2+3)(-5\lambda+\lambda^2+3)^2(-4\lambda+2\lambda^2+3)(-7\lambda+3\lambda^2+3)} \\ & - \frac{\lambda(-203\,353\,434\,975\lambda^{12} + 350\,716\,379\,871\lambda^{11} - 488\,312\,722\,095\lambda^{10} + 551\,142\,449\,552\lambda^9 - 504\,159\,008\,281\lambda^8 + 372\,136\,194\,567\lambda^7)}{96(\lambda-1)^2(\lambda-2)^2(2\lambda-3)^2(4\lambda-3)^2(5\lambda-3)^2(-2\lambda+\lambda^2+3)(-5\lambda+\lambda^2+3)^2(-4\lambda+2\lambda^2+3)(-7\lambda+3\lambda^2+3)} \\ & - \frac{\lambda(-219\,653\,377\,992\lambda^6 + 102\,140\,474\,607\lambda^5 - 36\,558\,733\,185\lambda^4 + 9711\,109\,602\lambda^3 - 1801\,641\,852\lambda^2 + 208\,222\,083\lambda - 11\,278\,359)}{96(\lambda-1)^2(\lambda-2)^2(2\lambda-3)^2(4\lambda-3)^2(5\lambda-3)^2(-2\lambda+\lambda^2+3)(-5\lambda+\lambda^2+3)^2(-4\lambda+2\lambda^2+3)(-7\lambda+3\lambda^2+3)} \end{aligned}$$

If $\frac{1}{2} \leq \lambda \leq 1$, $P(F'_\lambda, TP, IAC) =$

$$\frac{132\lambda + 9346\lambda^2 - 55\,961\lambda^3 + 161\,587\lambda^4 - 283\,660\lambda^5 + 330\,502\lambda^6 - 265\,921\lambda^7 + 149\,437\lambda^8 - 57\,766\lambda^9 + 14\,560\lambda^{10} - 2112\lambda^{11} + 128\lambda^{12} - 180}{288\lambda^3(\lambda-2)^2(3-2\lambda)(-2\lambda+\lambda^2+3)(-4\lambda+2\lambda^2+3)}$$

Proof See Appendix D for further details on the computation. \square

The limit, as the total number n of voters tends to infinity, of the probability of observing, under the IAC assumption, a voting situation at which the truncation paradox may occur given the runoff scoring rule F'_λ increases from 0 to 0.5 as the weight λ increases from 0 (the Plurality rule) to 1 (the Antiplural rule). Moreover each one-shot scoring rule is more vulnerable to the truncation paradox than its

corresponding runoff rule. For an overview of the behavior of $P(F'_\lambda, TP, IAC)$, see Figure 1 or Table 3 where some numerical evaluations are reported. Finally, while the Plurality rule is not vulnerable to the truncation paradox but as a one-shot rule or a runoff rule, the Antiplurality rule appears to be the most vulnerable rule among the scoring rules with three candidates.

An analysis of the vulnerability of runoff scoring rules to profitable abstention in three-candidate elections is available from Lepelley and Merlin (2001) for the main scoring runoff rules, and from Kamwa et al. (2018) for the whole family of scoring runoff rules. Comparing their probabilities on the No-show paradox with those we obtain on the truncation paradox, it comes that the truncation paradox is always more likely to occur than the No-show paradox for all $0 < \lambda \leq 1$. This is consistent with the fact that the truncation paradox is a weak version of the No-show paradox.

4 The impact of single-peaked preferences

In their paper, Kamwa et al. (2018) showed that when preferences are single-peaked in three-candidate elections, the No-show paradox never occurs with all the scoring runoff located between the Borda runoff and the Antiplurality runoff, i.e., for all $\lambda \in [\frac{1}{2}, 1]$. It comes from their probability computations that the likelihood of the No-show paradox is drastically reduced with single-peaked preferences. In this section, we also want to check what happen with the truncation paradox when preferences are single-peaked.

With three candidates, when preferences are single-peaked, there is one candidate that is not bottom ranked. On $A = \{a, b, c\}$, we assume without loss of generality that candidate c is never bottom ranked. Table 4 describes a voting situation with three candidates and single-peaked preferences.

Table 4 Single-peaked preferences and scores on $A = \{a, b, c\}$

Preference types	First stage scores
$n_2 : acb \quad n_4 : bca$	$S(\pi, \lambda, a) = n_2 + \lambda n_5$
$n_5 : cab \quad n_6 : cba$	$S(\pi, \lambda, b) = n_4 + \lambda n_6$
	$S(\pi, \lambda, c) = n_5 + n_6 + \lambda(n_2 + n_4)$

In the sequel we assume that only the four preference types in Table 4 are observable. Note that when candidate a wins in a voting situation, only voters of type 4 and 6 who strictly prefer b to a may truncate their rankings in order to favor the election of b . Since candidate a is bottom ranked by all those voters, there is no way left to favor candidate b by preference truncation. Similarly, when candidate b wins in a one-shot rule, there is no opportunity to favor candidate a by preference truncation. The conditions of Proposition 1 for one-shot scoring rules still apply for viable sincere truncation of preference when preferences are single-peaked; except for the restriction just outlined and reported in Proposition 5 below.

Proposition 5 *Consider a voting situation on $A = \{a, b, c\}$ with single-peaked preferences such that candidate c is never bottom ranked in the individual preferences. Assume that the voting rule is a one-shot scoring rule.*

- *When candidate a (or candidate b) is the election winner in π for $\lambda \in]0, 1[$, then the truncation paradox is susceptible to occur in π only in favor of c .*
- *When candidate c is the election winner in π for $\lambda \in]0, 1]$, it is possible to favor a candidate in $A \setminus \{c\}$ by sincere truncation of preferences.*

Proof See Appendix E. □

In the same way, the conditions of Proposition 3 also identify all the scenarios at which a run-off rule is vulnerable to the truncation paradox when individual preferences are single-peaked except for the restriction provided in Proposition 6 below.

Proposition 6 *Consider a voting situation on $A = \{a, b, c\}$ with single-peaked preferences such that candidate c is never bottom ranked in individual preferences.*

- i) *Assume that candidate c is eliminated after the first run. In this case, the truncation paradox can occur only in favor of candidate c ; and only for all the scoring runoff rules associated with $\lambda \in]0, \frac{1}{2}[$.*
- ii) *Assume that candidate a or b wins the second run versus candidate c . The truncation paradox never occur for all the scoring runoff rules with $\lambda \in]0, 1]$.*
- iii) *Assume that candidate c wins the second run versus candidate a or b . The truncation paradox can occur for all the scoring runoff rules such that $\lambda \in]0, 1[$.*

Proof See Appendix F. □


What comes from this proposition is that single-peaked preferences do not evacuate the truncation paradox in the same manner as they do with the No-show paradox; as with the No-show paradox, they totally evacuate the truncation paradox for voting situations under which the never bottom ranked candidate loses at the second stage. Table 5 gives in three-candidate elections with single-peaked preferences, all the scoring run-off rules vulnerable to the truncation paradox and to the No-show paradox for all the possible configurations: i) a wins the second stage versus b ; ii) a or b wins the second stage versus c and iii) c wins the second stage versus a or b . The reader can then notice from Table 5 that the impact of single-peaked preferences on the truncation paradox is not the same as on the Abstention paradox although the first paradox is the weaker version of the second.

More interestingly, we observe some further behavior of one-shot scoring rules. Note that in the general case, the probability that a one-shot scoring rule exhibits the truncation paradox given that the winner is a given candidate is the same from a candidate to another. But when preferences are single-peaked, results from computations provided in the next proposition and sketched in Figure 2 show that a one-shot scoring rule is more vulnerable to the truncation paradox when the centrist candidate c is elected than when the leftist candidate a or the rightist candidate b is elected.

Table 5 Vulnerable scoring run-off rules with three candidates and single-peaked preferences

Second-round opponents	a vs. b	a or b wins vs. c	c wins vs. a or b
Abstention*	$\lambda \in [0 \frac{1}{2}[$	-	$\lambda \in]0 \frac{1}{2}[$
Truncation	$\lambda \in]0 \frac{1}{2}[$	-	$\lambda \in]0 1[$

★From Kamwa et al. (2018)

Fig. 2 Single-peakedness: vulnerability of one-shot rules to the truncation paradox

In the next propositions, we report global probabilities we obtained by performing the probability computation over all the possible scenarios for the truncation paradox on the single-peaked domain. As expected, these probabilities are lower than those we observe on the universal domain. However, these probabilities remain significantly high.

Proposition 7 Consider the one-shot rule associated with the scoring vector $w_\lambda = (1, \lambda, 0)$ with $0 < \lambda \leq 1$. As the total number n of voters tends to infinity, the limit probability $P(F_\lambda, TP, IAC, SP)$ of observing a voting situation at which the truncation paradox may occur is as follows :

$$\text{If } 0 \leq \lambda \leq \frac{1}{2}, P(F_\lambda, TP, IAC, SP) = \frac{\lambda(-94\lambda^5 - 441\lambda^4 - 30\lambda^7 + 108\lambda^6 + 1602\lambda^3 - 2456\lambda^2 + 1812\lambda - 513 + 4\lambda^8)}{9(3-2\lambda)(\lambda-1)^2(-2+\lambda)^2(3+\lambda^2-2\lambda)(\lambda+3)}$$

$$\text{If } \frac{1}{2} \leq \lambda \leq 1, P(F_\lambda, TP, IAC, SP) = \frac{-65\lambda^2 - 6\lambda^4 + 38\lambda^3 + 43\lambda - 4\lambda^5 + 2\lambda^6 - 4}{(\lambda-2)^2(\lambda+3)(\lambda^2-2\lambda+3)}$$

Proposition 8 Consider the runoff rule associated with the scoring vector $w_\lambda = (1, \lambda, 0)$ with $0 < \lambda \leq 1$. As the total number n of voters tends to infinity, the limit probability $P(F'_\lambda, TP, IAC, SP)$ of observing a voting situation at which the truncation paradox may occur is as follows :

$$\text{If } 0 \leq \lambda \leq \frac{1}{2}, P(F'_\lambda, TP, IAC, SP) = \frac{\lambda(-110\lambda^6 + 322\lambda^5 - 64\lambda^7 + 4374\lambda^2 + 365\lambda^4 + 22\lambda^8 + 657 - 2684\lambda^3 - 2850\lambda)}{24(2-\lambda)(-3+\lambda)(-3+2\lambda)(\lambda-1)^2(3+\lambda^2-2\lambda)(\lambda+3)}$$

$$\text{If } \frac{1}{2} \leq \lambda \leq 1, P(F'_\lambda, TP, IAC, SP) = \frac{(\lambda-1)^2(-\lambda^3 + 2\lambda^2 + 7\lambda - 15 + \lambda^4)}{4(2-\lambda)(\lambda^2-2\lambda+3)(-3+2\lambda)(\lambda+3)}$$

Vulnerabilities to the truncation paradox reported in Proposition 7 and Proposition 8 are computed using very similar arguments to the proofs of Proposition 3 and Proposition 4 respectively. One simply needs to consider the possible scenarios described in Proposition 5 and Proposition 6. These details are simply omitted.

With runoff scoring rules the effect of single-peaked preferences is completely remarkable: it reduces the probability of truncation probability to less than 0.035 for all the runoff scoring rules. Moreover, when the centrist candidate c is the winner, the probability that a runoff scoring rule is very low and even null when the weight λ lays between 0.5 and 1. What is also surprising is that the runoff version of the Antipluralism rule is now immune to the truncation paradox. To see this, note that when $\lambda = 1$ and candidate c is ranked last by no voter, candidate is always qualified for the second round whether preferences are truncated by voters of type 2 (or type 4) or not. Figure 3 shows how single-peakedness curves downward the vulnerability of runoff scoring rules to the truncation paradox.



Fig. 3 Single-peakedness: vulnerability of runoff rules to the truncation paradox

Figure 4 is a comparative visualization of the vulnerability of both one-shot scoring rules and runoff scoring rules to the truncation paradox when preferences are single-peaked. It obviously highlights the fact that each one-shot scoring rule is still more vulnerable to the truncation paradox than its runoff version even with single-peaked preferences.

Fig. 4 Single-peakedness: vulnerability of one-shot rules and runoff rules to the truncation paradox

5 Concluding remarks

Since Fishburn and Brams (1984), we know that almost all the well-known voting rules are vulnerable to the truncation paradox except the Plurality rule, the Plurality runoff and the Approval voting. In this paper, we have characterized all the three-candidate voting situations under which the truncation paradox can occur for scoring rules and scoring runoff rules under both the universal and the single-peaked domains. Then, we have computed the limiting probability of the truncation paradox. By comparing our results to those obtained by Lepelley and Merlin (2001) and Kamwa et al. (2018) concerning the likelihood of the Abstention paradox, we concluded that the Abstention paradox is less likely to occur than the truncation paradox. So, deciding to render voting compulsory in order to counter paradoxical outcomes due to the behavior of abstention seems to be not a good choice at all.

With single-peaked preferences, we found that the occurrence of the truncation paradox depends on the configuration of the second run: if the never-bottom ranked candidate loses the second run versus one of the other candidates, the truncation paradox never occurs; if this candidate is rushed out at the first stage, the truncation paradox never occurs with all the scoring runoff located between the Borda runoff and the Antiplurality runoff.

Appendices

A. Proof of Proposition 1

Consider a voting situation $\pi = (n_1, n_2, n_3, n_4, n_5, n_6)$ on $A = \{a, b, c\}$, the one-shot rule associated with $0 < \lambda \leq 1$ and a pair $\{x, y\}$ of candidates. Let z be the third candidate.

Necessity. Assume that x is the election winner at π , and that the truncation paradox is susceptible to occur in π in favor of y . Then by truncating their true preferences, some coalition of voters, say S , favor the election of y . Moreover each voter in S strictly prefers y to x . Since the truncation operation only affects the second ranked candidates of each voter in S , then the preferences of each voter in S is yxz or yzx . At the new voting situation π' , y wins. Note that $|S| \leq n_{yxz}(\pi) + n_{yzx}(\pi)$. Then from π' to $\pi([yxz])$, the score of y increases, the scores of both x and z decrease. Hence y also wins in $\pi([yxz, yzx])$.

Sufficiency Assume that x is the election winner at π while y wins in $\pi([yxz, yzx])$. Clearly, the truncation paradox is susceptible to occur in π in favor of y since all voters who truncate their preferences in $\pi([yxz, yzx])$ prefers y to x .

B. Computation details for Proposition 2

Let T_x denote the set of all voting situations at which x is the election winner while the truncation paradox is susceptible to occur; and T_{xy} the subset of T_x that consists of all voting situations at which truncating preferences may favor the election of y . Note for example that

$$T_a = T_{ab} \cup T_{ac} \text{ and } |T_a| = |T_{ab}| + |T_{ac}| - |T_{ab} \cap T_{ac}|.$$

By Proposition 1, $\pi \in T_{ab}$ if and only if $S(\pi, \lambda, a) \geq S(\pi, \lambda, b)$, $S(\pi, \lambda, a) \geq S(\pi, \lambda, c)$, $S(\pi[bac, bca], \lambda, b) > S(\pi[bac, bca], \lambda, a)$ and $S(\pi[bac, bca], \lambda, b) \geq S(\pi[bac, bca], \lambda, c)$. Equivalently,

$$\pi \in T_{ab} \iff \begin{cases} (\lambda - 1)n_1 - n_2 + (1 - \lambda)n_3 + n_4 - \lambda n_5 + \lambda n_6 \leq 0 \\ -n_1 + (\lambda - 1)n_2 - \lambda n_3 + \lambda n_4 + (1 - \lambda)n_5 + n_6 \leq 0 \\ (1 - \lambda)n_1 + n_2 - n_3 - n_4 + \lambda n_5 - \lambda n_6 < 0 \\ -\lambda n_1 + \lambda n_2 - n_3 - n_4 + n_5 + (1 - \lambda)n_6 \leq 0 \end{cases}$$

Clearly, each of the six possible sets T_{xy} with $x, y \in A$ can be similarly described by a set of four linear constraints as with T_{ab} above. As n tends to infinity, $\text{vol}(P_{xy})$ is the 5-dimensional volume of the polytope P_{xy} obtained from the characterization of T_{xy} by replacing each n_j by $p_j = \frac{n_j}{n}$. Note that some inequalities in the characterization of P_{xy} may be strict. We simply ignore this while evaluating $\text{vol}(P_{xy})$ by considering the closure of P_{xy} obtained from the characterization of P_{xy} by turning each strict

inequality ($<$) to its larger form (\leq); by doing so, we simply move from P_{xy} to its closure without changing the volume. Taking into account that T_a , T_b and T_c are disjoint sets of voting situations; and since by symmetries, all the six possible T_{xy} generates polytopes of equal volume, the limit probability $P(F_\lambda, TP, IAC)$ of observing, under the IAC assumption, a voting situation at which the truncation paradox may occur is

$$P(F, TP, IAC) = \frac{\text{vol}(P_a) + \text{vol}(P_b) + \text{vol}(P_c)}{\text{vol}(P)} = \frac{720\text{vol}(P_{ab}) - 360\text{vol}(P_{ab} \cap P_{ac})}{\text{vol}(P)}$$

where P is the simplex $P = \{(p_1, p_2, \dots, p_6) : \sum_{j=1}^6 p_j = 1 \text{ with } p_j \geq 0, j = 1, 2, \dots, 6\}$. Given $0 < \lambda \leq 1$, computing $\text{vol}(P_{ab})$ and $\text{vol}(P_{ab} \cap P_{ac})$, one obtains the result of Proposition 1. All volume computations performed in this paper use the same technique as in Cervone et al. (2005).⁴ Roughly, one needs for example to determine all vertices of the given polytope and then triangulate the set of those vertices into simplices. More details are presented in Moyouwou and Tchantcho (2015) and Gehrlein and Lepelley (2011); further illustrations are available in Gehrlein et al. (2015) or more recently in Lepelley et al. (2018). A Maple procedure is also available from authors upon request. Of course, there is an abundant literature on volume computations with very efficient algorithms and packages as for Büeler et al. (2000) and Lawrence (1991) for a Maple users or Bruns and Ichim (2010) and Bruns et al. (2019, 2018).

C. Proof of Proposition 3

Consider a voting situation $\pi = (n_1, n_2, n_3, n_4, n_5, n_6)$ on $A = \{a, b, c\}$ and the runoff rule associated with $0 < \lambda \leq 1$. Assume that x is the winner, y is the challenger and z is the first-round loser.

1. *Necessity.* First assume that the truncation paradox is susceptible to occur at π in favor of y . Then by truncating their true preferences, some coalition of voters, say S , diminish the score of x in such a way that x is now ruled out at the first round and y wins against z at the second round. Each voter in S strictly prefers y to x . The truncation operation by such a voter is only intended to diminish the score of x at the first round. Thus the preferences of each voter in S is yxz . In the new voting situation π' , y wins. Since from π' to π ($[yxz]$), the score of y does not decrease, the score of x does not increase, the score of z is unchanged and the second round duel is not affected by the truncation operation, then y also wins in π ($[yxz]$) against z at the second round.

⁴ This technique was recently used in many research papers such as in Diss and Gehrlein (2015, 2012), Gehrlein et al. (2015), Kamwa et al. (2018), Kamwa and Valognes (2017), Moyouwou and Tchantcho (2015) and Kamwa (2019) among others.

Sufficiency Assume that y wins the majority duel against z and x is the first-round loser at $\pi([yxz])$. Then under the corresponding runoff rule, y wins in $\pi([yxz])$ against z at the second round. Hence, the truncation paradox occurs.

2. *Necessity.* Assume that the truncation paradox is susceptible to occur at π in favor of z . By truncating their true preferences, members of some coalition, say S , favor the election of z they strictly prefer to x . In the new voting situation π' , z wins the majority duel against x or against y . First suppose that z wins in π' against x at the second round. Then y is the first-round loser at π' . Moreover, voters in S all strictly prefer z to x ; and the truncation operation is intended, at the first round in π' , to diminish the score of y . Thus the preference of each voter in S is zyx . Hence $|S| \leq n_{zyx}(\pi)$. Therefore, in $\pi([zyx])$, z also wins against x and y is the first round loser. Finally, suppose that z wins in π' against y at the second round. Then x is the first-round loser at π' . Voters in S all strictly prefer z to y ; and the truncation operation is intended, at the first round in π' , to diminish the score of x . The preference of each voter in S is then zxy . This implies that $|S| \leq n_{zxy}(\pi)$. In $\pi([zxy])$, z also wins against y and x is the first round loser.

Sufficiency Assume that z wins the majority duel against y and x is the first-round loser in $\pi([zxy])$. Then under the corresponding runoff rule, z wins in $\pi([zxy])$ against y at the second round. In the same way, suppose that z wins the majority duel against x and y is the first-round loser in $\pi([zyx])$. Then under the corresponding runoff rule, z wins in $\pi([zyx])$ against x at the second round. In both cases, the truncation paradox occurs.

D- Computations details for Proposition 4

Given $0 < \lambda \leq 1$, let R_{xy} denote the set of all voting situations at which the truncation paradox is susceptible to occur in favor of some candidate u under the runoff rule associated with the weight λ while x and y are respectively the election winner and the challenger. Let z be the first-round loser at each voting situation in R_{xy} . Denote by R_{xyy} the subset of R_{xy} that consists of all voting situations at which truncating preferences may favor the election of y ; by R_{xyz} the subset of R_{xy} that consists of all voting situations at which truncating preferences may favor the election of z against x at the second round; and by R'_{xyz} the subset of R_{xy} that consists of all voting situations at which truncating preferences may favor the election of z against y at the second round. Then by Proposition 3

$$R_{ab} = R_{abb} \cup R_{abc} \cup R'_{abc}.$$

Note that R_{abb} and R_{abc} are disjoint sets of voting situations since y wins the majority duel against z at each voting situation in R_{abb} while the converse holds at each voting situation in R_{abc} . Therefore

$$|R_{ab}| = |R_{abb}| + |R_{abc}| + |R'_{abc}| - |R_{abb} \cap R'_{abc}| - |R_{abc} \cap R'_{abc}|.$$

Note that by Proposition 3, R_{abb} , R_{abc} and R'_{abc} are each defined by some set of linear constraints. Therefore the probability that the corresponding runoff rule exhibits the truncation paradox is derived by computing the volume of the polytopes P_{abb} , P_{abc} and P'_{abc} associated to R_{abb} , R_{abc} and R'_{abc} respectively. More precisely, by considering the six possible sets R_{xy} for all two ordered pairs (x, y) from $\{a, b, c\}$ and taking in the account possible symmetries, the limit probability $P(F_\lambda, TP, IAC)$ of observing, under the IAC assumption, a voting situation with three candidates at which the truncation paradox may occur is

$$Pr(F', TP, IAC) = 720 \left[vol(P_{abb}) + vol(P_{abc}) + vol(P'_{abc}) - vol(P_{abb} \cap P'_{abc}) - vol(P_{abc} \cap P'_{abc}) \right]$$

E. Proof of Proposition 5

Assume that preferences are single-peaked in such a way that candidate c is bottom ranked by no voters. When candidate a is elected, voters who prefer b to a are of type 4 or type 6. But these voters do not affect the score of candidate a by a sincere truncation of their preferences. Thus candidate b can not be elected by sincere truncation of preferences. Similarly, when candidate b is elected, there no way for voters who strictly prefer a to b to favor the election of a by simply truncating their rankings. Therefore, truncation paradox may only occur in favor of c when a (or b) is the winner of a one-shot scoring rule and preferences are single-peaked.

F. Proof of Proposition 6

- i) Let us assume that candidate a wins versus candidate b ⁵ with $\lambda \in [\frac{1}{2}, 1]$. Note we should have $S(\pi, \lambda, c) \leq S(\pi, \lambda, a)$ and $S(\pi, \lambda, c) \leq S(\pi, \lambda, b)$. It follows that

$$S(\pi, \lambda, c) - \frac{S(\pi, \lambda, a) + S(\pi, \lambda, b)}{2} = \frac{2 - \lambda}{2} (x_5 + x_6) + \frac{2\lambda - 1}{2} (x_4 + x_2) \leq 0.$$

This occurs if and only if $\lambda = \frac{1}{2}$ and $x_5 = x_6 = 0$. In this case, the three candidates all tie and there is no way for profitable truncation of preferences.

Now suppose that $\lambda \in]0, \frac{1}{2}[$ and show that the paradox can occur for all λ in this interval. Let us assume a voting situation where $n_2 = n_5 = \alpha$ and $n_3 = n_4 + 1 = z$ with $z = \lceil \frac{2}{\lambda} - 3 \rceil + 1$ and $\alpha = \lfloor \frac{2z-1}{1-2\lambda} \rfloor - 1$ for $\lambda \in]0, \frac{1}{2}[$. The scores are : $S(\pi, \lambda, a) = \alpha + \lambda z$, $S(\pi, \lambda, b) = \alpha + \lambda(z - 1)$ and $S(\pi, \lambda, c) = 2z - 1 + 2\lambda\alpha$. It follows that $S(\pi, \lambda, a) > S(\pi, \lambda, b)$, $S(\pi, \lambda, b) > S(\pi, \lambda, c)$. Candidate c is eliminated and candidate a wins the second run since $aM(\pi)b$. Assume that all the voters

⁵ The symmetric to the case “candidate b wins the second stage versus a ” is handled in a similar way.

of type 3 truncate. The new scores are : $S(\pi', \lambda, a) = \alpha$, $S(\pi', \lambda, b) = S(\pi, \lambda, b)$ and $S(\pi', \lambda, c) = S(\pi, \lambda, c)$. We still have $S(\pi, \lambda, b) > S(\pi, \lambda, c)$. Let us show that $S(\pi, \lambda, c) - S(\pi', \lambda, a)$.

$$\begin{aligned} S(\pi, \lambda, c) - S(\pi', \lambda, a) &= 2z - 1 - (1 - 2\lambda)x \\ &= 2z - 1 - (1 - 2\lambda) \left(\left\lfloor \frac{2z-1}{1-2\lambda} \right\rfloor - 1 \right) \\ &= 2z - 1 - (1 - 2\lambda) \left\lfloor \frac{2z-1}{1-2\lambda} \right\rfloor + (1 - 2\lambda) \end{aligned}$$

For all $\lambda \in]0, \frac{1}{2}[$, we have $z > 1$; so, $2z > 1$ and $2z - 1 > 0$. Also, $(1 - 2\lambda) > 0$ and we know that $(1 - 2\lambda) \left\lfloor \frac{2z-1}{1-2\lambda} \right\rfloor \leq 2z - 1$. Thus, $S(\pi, \lambda, c) - S(\pi', \lambda, a) > 0$. So, candidate a is eliminated. Since $x + 2z - 1 > \alpha$, $cM(\pi')b$: candidate c is the new winner. Thus, by sincere truncation of other rankings, voters of type 3 have favored their best candidate.

- ii) Assume that candidate a wins the second stage versus c .⁶ This means that aMc through $x_2 \geq x_4 + x_5 + x_6$ and thus $x_2 \geq \frac{1}{2}$. Note that only voters of type 5 have an incentive to manipulate and the possibility to affect the score of a by sincere truncation of their rankings in favor of c . But by any truncation from π to a new voting situation π' , we still have $S(\pi', \lambda, a) \geq \frac{1}{2}$ and $S(\pi, \lambda, b) = x_4 + \lambda x_6 \leq x_4 + x_5 + x_6 \leq \frac{1}{2}$. Therefore candidate c still attains the second run and wins the election against c .
- iii) Let us assume that candidate c wins the second stage versus a . Let us first consider $\lambda = 1$. Evidently, candidate c wins. If she wins versus candidate a , this means that $S(\pi, \lambda, a) > S(\pi, \lambda, b)$ which is equivalent to $n_2 + n_5 > n_4 + n_6$ (i). Candidate b will become the new winner after voters of type 4 truncate if $S(\pi, \lambda, b) > S(\pi', \lambda, c)$ (ii); and that $bM(\pi')a$ (iii). This last requirement is equivalent to $n_4 + n_6 > n_2 + n_5$ which contradicts (i): voters of type 4 cannot manipulate for $\lambda = 1$. If voters of type 2 truncate, nothing will happen since the new score of candidate c although diminished by λn_2 will still be greater than that of candidate b : voters of type 2 cannot manipulate for $\lambda = 1$. Thus, the truncation paradox is not possible for $\lambda = 1$. To prove that it can happen for $\lambda \in]0, 1[$, one can consider a profile such that $n_2 = 3$, $n_4 = 2$, $n_5 = 1$ and $n_6 = 1$.

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⁶ This is symmetric to the case “candidate b wins the second stage versus c ”.

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