

*Citizen Advisory Committees in the Contingent Valuation Method process*

Philippe Bance and Angélique Chassy

Politics and Policy (P&P) 2020

<https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12364>

**Abstract**

The *Contingent Valuation Method* (CVM) is a tool of economic analysis whose purpose is to measure, on the basis of individuals' stated preferences, the utility they attach to the production of public goods, thereby enabling a public decision-maker to arbitrate between different items of expenditure. The approach has been deployed as part of a centralist conceptual scheme that leaves little room for citizens in the decision-making process and is now being challenged by the increasing prominence of multilevel governance, particularly in Europe. The purpose of this article is to discuss the use in this context of *citizen advisory committees* (CACs) rather than the other participatory tools sometimes recommended in contingent valuation studies, such as citizen juries and the scenario workshop. It also discusses the limitations of the CAC/CVM combination in order to ensure that citizens' opinions are fully taken into account in the specification and implementation of public programmes.

**Keywords:** Citizen participation, public goods, public decision-making, public management, valuation, willingness to pay.

## Introduction

In order to ascertain citizens' preferences, the authorities need to have measurement tools. Among such tools, the contingent valuation method (CVM) is particularly popular in standard economic analyses. It is an ex ante evaluation technique which aims to base the choices of decision-makers to arbitrate on the public goods that should be produced with regard to individual preferences. Its purpose is to use citizen-consumers' stated preferences in order to ascribe a monetary value to the utility they attach to the production of public goods. The CVM was developed under the influence of the federal government of the United States as part of the country's environmental policy, and more particularly by the Environment Protection Agency, which drew inspiration from the pioneering works of Ciriacy-Wantrop (1947), Davis (1963), Randall, Ives, & Eastman (1974), Mitchell & Carson (1989) and Arrow et al. (1993). Beyond this implementation framework, the method can be applied to policies dedicated to various kinds of programmes of production of public goods (justice, police, education, health, social protection...). For proponents of the method, it can be used to assess the relevance of producing most non-market public goods. For several decades, the CVM has been used extensively by governments in many countries as a tool for specifying collective needs and arbitrating for public spending. The CVM has become an object of infatuation, with several thousands of contingent studies having been carried out throughout the world in recent decades (Carson, 2011 and Flachaire & Hollard, 2005). However, the CVM's intrinsic complexity gives rise to significant difficulties of implementation. Despite the recommendations of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) panel to make the results of the method more reliable, Diamond and Hausman (1993) note that the main problem with the method is that the individuals questioned do not provide correct information because they are not generally expecting to answer the questionnaires and their hypothetical scenarios.

Hausman (2012) also notes that a contingent valuation does not provide a solid basis for assisting with policy development, to which Carson (2012) replies that the debates seeking only to criticise the method must be stopped and efforts made instead to improve it. The difficulties of applying the CVM are all the greater for public authorities operating within a multilevel governance regime, that is to say when different levels of government (local, regional, national or supranational) act jointly to produce public goods: levels of expertise among decision-makers are particularly uneven and some of them have reservations about the method (Bance & Chassy, 2017, 2018). However, the CVM enables the various decision-makers to analyze and debate, on a common and enlightened basis, the relevance of producing public goods together. This leads us to consider the idea that a much closer link must be established between public authorities and citizen-users of public goods as part of any attempt to use the CVM in order to ascertain citizens' preferences. Our contribution, therefore, is to explain how new decision-making tools, such as CACs, may prove to be useful participatory aids in concerted decision-making between the various public actors and citizens. We want to demonstrate also that from this point of view they are better tools than citizen juries<sup>1</sup> (Terreaux and Brahic, 2009, Lafont, 2017) or the workshops (Faburel et al., 2000) that are used in the private sector. To this end, we will specify how CACs may facilitate identification of citizens' preferences as public action is constructed jointly by decision-makers and citizens, as well as the transformations of public governance to which they give rise in a multi-level context. This leads us to present the methodological underpinnings of the CVM and the limits on the extent to which citizens can appropriate and use the approach. This analysis will enable us to justify the use

---

<sup>1</sup> A "Citizen Jury" is sometimes called "Conference of Citizens" or "Citizen Consensus".

of CACs in the implementation of the CVM and also to clarify how to make this combination possible, given the limitations of CACs.

## **1. The CVM and its support for individual and citizen preferences**

In a context of multilevel governance, that is of joint decision-making by various levels of government (local, regional, national and supranational), the CVM can be a useful tool that enables public authorities to arbitrate between various programmes by basing choices on citizens' preferences. However, as we will see, the CVM process can modify individual preferences, in particular in a multilevel policy making context. More, it must be noted that, as a purely economic assessment tool, the CVM is often regarded as inadequate when judged against its initial objective of taking into account citizens-consumers' preferences in the decision-making process.

### **1.1 The CVM: a tool for evaluating the social utility of public goods in a multilevel regime**

The CVM is part of a process that aims to make cost-benefit analysis operational in order to inform the production of public goods on the basis of an ex ante evaluation of individual preferences. The monetary value of non-market goods is calculated on the basis of hypothetical scenarios. A scenario "*constitutes the medium of exchange between "the supplier" of the public good (...) (the public or private decision-maker) and "its potential consumer" (society)*" (Voltaire et al., 2011: 184). It establishes consumers' *willingness to pay* (WTP) for improvements to public goods or for measures to halt their deterioration. An equivalent argument can be couched in terms of *willingness to accept* (WTA), which is the sum to be paid to the individual to compensate for the reduction or deterioration of a public good. This approach is found in the utilitarian cost-benefit calculation, where the aim is to use individual preferences as a basis for determining the social value of public goods. By aggregating the amount of individuals' willingness to pay, a 'shadow price' is obtained for the good in question.

These monetised benefits are then compared with the costs incurred by the programme under consideration in order to decide whether or not to put it into practice. If there is a 'social surplus', the programme is socially desirable and useful. Conversely, a 'social deficit' will cause the programme to be turned down. This comparison of the various programmes also enables public decision-makers to choose between possible courses of action (to hierarchise by selecting and eliminating programmes) in the light of existing financial constraints. It is possible to apply the CVM to a multilevel governance regime: the information provided allows each decision-maker to negotiate by comparing the projects and choosing the one that is most justifiable to them, given the funding constraints. It was for this reason that this governance regime was established within the EU, together with the notion of subsidiarity, which was introduced by the Maastricht Treaty (signed 7 February 1992) and then enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty (signed on 13 December 2007 and entered into force on 1 December 2009) as the Union's fundamental principle. Subsidiarity is a principle that holds that decisions should be taken as close as possible to the citizen - as long as public action can be carried out effectively at that level. Therefore, profound changes in institutional architecture have taken place in Europe with the establishment of multilevel governance systems in which different levels of government (local, national and supranational) operate in concert with each other. This being the case, public action is a product of the shared prerogatives that lead these various levels of government to make joint decisions and thus to agree on the programmes to be implemented. However, these considerations do not reduce the public authorities' use of the CVM. After all, certain public decision-makers, particularly at the sub-national level, feel a growing need to appropriate this economic valuation tool in order to strengthen the foundations on which evaluations of their programmes for the production of public

goods rest by introducing a greater degree of expertise into the process. Consequently, they seek to appropriate the CVM in order to take informed decisions on the basis of contingent surveys.

Correct application of the method is, however, subject to certain conditions, in particular that citizens be adequately involved in providing credible information to local, national and supranational decision-makers. In order to do this, hypothetical scenarios must be well understood by the citizens, give an appropriate account of their preference and clearly express their direction for the production of public goods (Luchini, 2002; Chassy, 2014). This condition, if fulfilled, leads to the establishment of a much closer relationship with consumers of public goods in the process of implementing the method. However, it must be noted that this condition is generally not met.

## **1.2 The limits of citizen participation in public decision-making via the CVM**

In a multilevel decision-making context, the intention is generally to anchor public decision-making in citizens' preferences. In particular, the aim is to create more efficient and democratic management for the benefit of citizens in order to optimise expenditures, based on effective consultation between decision-makers and citizens. Indeed, citizens are not involved in the implementation of the method, are not at the centre of the decision-making process and "*appear as 'consigneés'*" (Favre et al., 2003: 45). In short, they are mere objects of public intervention. More precisely, it is possible to identify within the methodology of the CVM three successive operational stages, namely the drafting of the questionnaire, the evaluation by citizens and the final decision-making. With the exception of preliminary surveys, the first, *ex ante* stage does not traditionally involve citizens within its preconceived framework. Consequently, they have little input in the drafting of the questionnaire. It is mainly intended for public policy makers to decide which public policies need to be evaluated. Scientific experts or academics establish which hypothetical scenario is likely to be best understood by the persons surveyed in order to establish a good diagnosis. In a multilevel context, different governments are supposed to agree to assess the relevance of policies co-financed by policymakers.

After specifying the public goods to be produced or preserved, the decision-makers at the various levels deploy the CVM by proceeding to the joint drafting of questionnaires and defining the modalities and content of the evaluation programmes. They ask themselves the following questions. Why choose a particular programme? What types of hypothetical scenarios should be offered to citizens? How can scenarios be made understandable to citizens? The authorities then have to write the hypothetical scenarios deemed relevant into the questionnaires. The evaluation by citizens takes place in the second, *in itinere* stage; survey participants are invited to respond to the questionnaire and express their WTP with regard to implementation of the scenarios. The third, *ex post* operational stage is that in which the final decision is made by the public policy makers: they analyse and discuss on the basis of answers given by the citizens surveyed after aggregation of the WTP. The task here is to examine the profits or losses citizen-consumers have reported. Public policy makers are supposed to decide on public action programmes-by considering whether or not they meet citizen expectations and to prioritise them on that basis. Paradoxically, however, the preferences of citizen-consumers tend to be virtually ignored or significantly altered in this type of decision-making process. In representative democracies, public decision-making ultimately rests with the elected. The decision is delegated by the citizen to the elected representative, which does not necessarily give rise to transparency for choices by the politician (Delebarre, 1998). In this context, citizens risk being instrumentalised (Chassy, 2011:164). Its lack of upstream mobilisation and the plurality of public decision makers explain why this is the case. The diversity of stakeholder concerns makes it inherently difficult to specify the nature and outcomes of the programmes to be evaluated. The difficulties citizens experience in understanding the scenarios proposed by public decision-makers are a second reason. Not everyone has the same

ability to understand questionnaires. According to Bourdieu, the contents of the questionnaires are often not accessible to a large part of the population: "*questions posed in an opinion survey are not questions that really arise for all respondents*" (Bourdieu, 1973: 1301).

It is difficult for citizens to assess a programme's value if they are not directly affected by it. Erroneously, the survey method postulates that "everyone has an opinion on all subjects" (Blondiaux, 1997: 129). Biases are generated (by extreme or zero values for WTP) by consumers' poor understanding of certain subjects. This situation may also generate significant non-response rates and a large number of protest zeroes expressing rejection of the proposed hypothetical scenario. In France, a survey conducted in the field of priority education (Chassy, 2014) aimed to test the validity of the CVM outside its field of interest that is the environment. Using an identical questionnaire, the results highlighted the variation in data by survey mode. The existence of the non-response bias and the bias associated with the presence of the investigator leads to the fact that the questionnaire was not always easy to understand in the self-administered survey but also in the telephone survey. Regardless of the method of investigation, these biases call into question the quality of the information obtained in the service of public decision-making. It can be said that placing itself within the framework of hypothetical scenarios, for which one does not materialize the content well due to lack of knowledge of the effects produced (non-response/influence), makes the individual perception ill-founded and, as little as stable according to terms and conditions of the investigation. Mignauw (2016) states that in the matter of public projects, "*the protest may not be against the purpose of a project, but against its conception and content and the modalities of its realisation*" (208). Protests may also be triggered by the final decision-making, by the absence of citizens in the final arbitration or by citizens thinking that it is not up to them to pay. With the CVM, the decision makers "furthest from the citizens" are often also those who have by far the highest level of technical expertise. This leads them to consider themselves omniscient (Bance and Chassy, 2017). Thus, the lack of public debate causes citizens to call into question the choices made.

Consequently, it is impossible to be content with the normative design of the CVM in a multilevel regime. "*The questions formulated and the sometimes harsh judgments made of it suggest that it cannot alone guarantee institutional appropriation*" (Faburel et al., 2000: 103). The difficulty of decision-makers in appropriating a new decision support tool such as the CVM was the subject of a study in France by Faburel et al in the transport sector. Chassy's study (2014) also questioned political and institutional actors on the advisability of using MEC, focusing on the sector of priority education in Upper Normandy. The results are contested as to the interest shown in this method in these two studies. They show that the results of the method are questioned by decision-makers from both a theoretical and a methodological point of view. However, these decision-makers do not totally reject the CVM to help public decision-making. In the study by Faburel et al., it is specified that "it is a working method... which is rich and, despite certain limits, is nonetheless a support method..." (49). The method is also analyzed as a support for consultation upstream and of participatory procedures further downstream. Recommendations are also made so that all the players can take ownership of the method, in particular through wider communication around the methodological device and its objectives. Chassy's enquiry also shows that elected officials and state staff agents see the CVM as an upstream tool for helping public decision-making. They find it interesting that a democratic debate can be based at any time on the expression of individual preferences with reservations, however, as shown by the replies: "Knowing the feelings of individuals is an interesting thing except that 'we are on opinions but not a vote' (mayor in an urban area); "I will almost say yes so that individuals can have a look at reality" (mayor in peri-urban area); "If individuals do not want to finance the project, it should not be done" (mayor in a rural area); "In our consumer society, price is the only way for a democratic expression. But intrinsically, that means nothing because a common good is priceless "(state

agent). Thus, the CVM elicits mixed reactions and judgments that range from a great scepticism to a very strong interest.

It is therefore useful to rethink the CVM use in a multilevel public decision-making process by seeking to better integrate and involve citizens in the various stages of its implementation in order to improve the technical and social quality of public decision-making. Combining the CVM with other types of tools in order better to capture citizen preferences is necessary to improve its relevance (Ward 1999, Faburel et al., 2000, Terreaux and Brahic 2009).

## **2. Combining the CVM with other tools: the intrinsic superiority of CACs**

Deliberative, collaborative and participatory methods are increasingly being combined with stated preference methods. A multiplicity of tools has gradually been deployed in the context of field experiments by public decision-makers who, in conjunction with the actors, have sought to implement new forms of participatory democracy. We can thus observe on the ground “devices for associating citizens with reflections on public policies (...), aiming to simulate the creation of projects and networking (...), aiming to develop jointly projects or prototypes based on user expectations ”(General Secretariat for the Modernization of Public Action, 2017).<sup>2</sup> This has thus led to the establishment of citizen juries and workshops, as well as CACs, associating citizens with the conduct of public policies. So, CACs ~~can~~ need to be compared with citizen juries and workshops.

Here it is necessary to specify the contribution of each of these tools and to compare their advantages in the application of CVM. Other citizen participation tools could also be objects of analysis, such as Online Consultations, Open Ministry or World Wide Views (WWV) (also called “Global Citizen Debate”), aiming to associate closely, like the CACs, citizens to reflect on public policies. However, these tools have limits which lead to discard a more precise analysis here: difficulties of understanding linked to the complexity of the analysis object, distance from audiences, not aware of or weakly trained in digital technology for online consultation; lack of time for consultation (of one day maximum) for the development of the Open Ministry and WWC.

### **2.1 The alternative of citizen juries, workshops and CACs in the context of public decision-making based on the CVM**

Here we will analyse two categories of citizen consultation based on participatory tools, advocated in the implementation of the CVM: shared power and the power of influence, which are implemented through the three different mechanisms studied: citizens’ juries, workshops and CACs. We will specify the nature of the tools, the operating modes, the respective success factors and drawbacks, based in particular on French illustrations (the citizen jury of the city of Villeurbanne; the workshop of the Schneider Electric company; the CAC of the town of Millau) and the lessons that we were able to extract from interviews.

**The first category is a form of civic involvement that gives access to shared power. It takes the form of citizens juries and workshops.** This type of consultation is based on the notion of deliberative democracy developed by Rawls (1971) and Habermas (1992), which describes a process of exchanges of information and arguments with a view to decision-making.

Vergne (2008: 3-4) states that this process is part of *"a project initiated by a regional or central authority [wishing] to obtain informed opinion"*. Lafont (2017) specifies that citizen juries are set

---

<sup>2</sup> Secrétariat Général pour la Modernisation de l'Action Publique, 2017 « Boîte à outils des démarches de participation citoyenne », Paris. Site Internet : <https://www.modernisation.gouv.fr/sites/default/files/fichiers-attaches/boite-outils-demarches-participation.pdf>, accessed February 27, 2020

up as miniature versions of the general population in order to propose solutions to a political problem or to make a political decision. Citizens' juries are supposed to deliberate on behalf of the general public.

They were set up for this purpose in the 1970s in Germany and the United States. In Germany, the first citizen juries, the so-called "Planungszellen" or "planning cells", were set up to consider urban renewal in the city centre of Schwelm. They have since proliferated in German city districts, e.g. in Berlin. Their purpose is not to challenge public policies but to manage a so-called participatory budget granted by the authorities in order to improve daily life. In the United States, "citizens' juries" address sociotechnical issues such as telecommunications technologies and nanotechnologies. This type of civic involvement usually leads to the establishment of either a group of ordinary citizens selected by drawing lots (between 15 and 25 people) known as a deliberative panel (Blondiaux, 2008) or of a stratified sample or of a stratified random sample (Smith and Wales, 1999). This latter sample is randomly selected from pre-defined strata, that is to say one with characteristics chosen for the study in the target population. Each citizen selected may become a paid juror who undertakes to work diligently throughout a deliberation process that lasts several days. Participants are put into a learning situation coordinated by experts or representatives of organized interests: they are supported until their judgement has been formulated. The final decision, the "vote", is the result of a public debate in which different points of view are juxtaposed before a consensus is reached (cf. Appendix 1: Feedback from a Citizen Jury within the City of Villeurbanne in France). The workshops are widely used by companies to fine-tune the relationships between managers and their collaborators. They were initiated in 1992 in Denmark into public programmes, but they are very few used in this framework because their technical application (cf. Appendix 1: Feedback from a within the Schneider Electric company in France. According to the "Sciences Citoyennes" Foundation, their transposition would require the implementation of reflection groups comprising public decision-makers, experts and informed citizens who would be offered several political scenarios "to help develop a shared vision around a project" (Fondation Sciences Citoyennes, FSC, n.d.: 1).

The goal is to get the group to discuss different topics defined in advance by policymakers with a view to solving a political problem. A moderator presides over the reflection group, whose "optimal composition is of the order (...) of 4 or 5 participants" (Fondation Sciences Citoyennes, n.d.: 2), often for one to three days. Intra-group cooperation enables participants to reach a consensus by constructing a shared understanding or developing an action plan. The workshops are strongly recommended by the European Union in "*European Awareness Scenario Workshops (1997)*" as a means of contributing to public decision-making.

**The second category is consultation combined with so-called power of influence.** CACs are in this category. They are intended to be a means of observing, amending, proposing, advising and linking public decision-makers and citizens with a view to adapting public action programmes and evaluating the choices made and their effects on the community. A field survey made in 2019 in the Réunion Region concerning the creation of a CAC confirms this analysis : from 1,043 Reunionese responding to the questionnaires, 77% replied that the CAC must involve citizens in the construction of regional community projects; 72.82% said that the CAC must promote transparency regarding the use of public funds; 65% indicated that the CAC must promote citizens' initiative in order to be proactive in territorial projects. Furthermore, consultation by CAC "*gives people affected by a decision the opportunity to influence or even change it*" (Federation of Quebec Parents Committees, 2009: 10). CACs fall within the scope of participatory democracy in that they enable citizens to be involved in the formulation and implementation of public decisions. CACs are generally made up of a very diverse range of citizen drawn of lots on electoral list and volunteers from different backgrounds and cultures (young people, employed persons, retirees,

etc.). At the request of public decision-makers, the committee may be made up of qualified individuals serving on a voluntary basis, such as representatives of local voluntary associations, as well as of *"persons and groups furthest removed from the traditional consultative forums"* (reference framework – citizens' councils).

Thus, CACs are intended to be as representative of the population as citizens' juries on the basis of stratified random sampling. They have a longer lifetime than citizens' juries and workshops. They may run for one or two years for a particular research need or over the term of an elected local authority (5 or 6 years) or they may be established on a permanent basis to assist government organisations. CACs are intended to be chaired by a third party, who is a member elected by the committee. The chair is supported by another elected member regarded as *"the municipal contact"* who liaises with the other elected representatives in the municipality. Certain local experiments serve to illustrate this: in Canada in the so-called correctional service (Annual Report (2014-2015)); in Belgium within the Union of Cities and Municipalities of Wallonia/Union of Cities and Municipalities of the Walloon Region or as an integral part of the Code of Local Democracy and Decentralisation (art. L 1122-35); in France, in the communes of Digne-les-Bains (deliberations of the Municipal Council of Digne-les-Bains, meeting of 2 July 2008) and of Millau (cf. appendix 3: feedback from a CCC in the commune of Millau. The three participatory tools will now be compared in their association with the CVM.

#### **- Citizen juries can be linked to the CVM**

The objective of the citizen juries linked to the CVM is to obtain a monetary value. From this perspective, the CVM can be combined with this deliberative monetary process (Spash, 2008). Deliberative monetary valuation (DMV) makes it possible to place the economic valuation within an integrated social assessment based on the deliberation principle. The objective is not only to supplement the information on social welfare but also to better apprehend the existing social agreement on the WTP. Thus, Terreaux and Brahic (2009: 175) state that *"deliberative sessions could increase the validity and legitimacy of the results"*. They emphasise that these sessions could *"better reflect citizen preferences"* (175) and that *"ex-post deliberations may be used to adjust the results [WTP] of the evaluation where their interpretation and ex ante deliberations make it possible to test interviewees' understanding of different survey questions"* (p. 175).

This approach is applied on the basis of three types of voting behaviours (Terreaux and Brahic, 2009: 175) that are intended to:

1. *"validate the individual WTP-WTR by establishing a deliberative process among the people previously surveyed"* (Macmillon et al., 2002);
2. *"obtain an estimate by the group of the individual [WTP] [so that] the resulting decision can be equated to the fair price that should be established"* (Alvarez-Farizo and Honley, 2002);
3. *"seek a social WTP, in other words a previously aggregated value, which can be expressed (...) by a group"* (Gregory and Wellman, 2001; James and Blamey, 2005). A DMV carried out by citizen juries is a process of collective debate, exchange and learning in which the discussion between jury members and the subsequent vote focus on the monetary value of the good in question. However, its practical effectiveness can be undermined if there is not sufficient time for reflection. Thus Vergne (2008) suggests we should be cautious about the method's relevance in view of the fact that *"many citizens are just beginning to grasp the profound issues at stake at the end of the four days, at the very moment when the jury ends. Most of them are quite frustrated and also say they are not competent at the end of the process"* (9). The lack of time for discussion is of course inimical to the objective of rational decision-making. Indeed, *"The decision is too often abrupt, with or without prior negotiation"* (Bailly, 1998 :13). These comments reinforce those of Lafont (2017), who argues that citizen juries must *"re-examine the available information and reconsider the soundness of the views and arguments supported by the majority culture on the issue in question"* (23).



**- Mobilizing informed citizens in workshops has been advocated as a means of improving the CVM's institutional and social acceptability.**

Workshops were recommended by Faburel et al. (2000) in their study on "*the institutional and social acceptability of a firm of expertise applied to transport*".

In order to address the problems of comprehension associated with the CVM, Faburel et al. propose, "*as the final, short-lived window of opportunity*" (105), that a workshop be organised with the actors interviewed in order to better delineate the outlines of the CVM. The main purpose of the workshops is to reflect on or enrich the scenarios proposed by the decision-makers. While the selected group of individuals has knowledge derived from use and the necessary skills, they are not necessarily involved in the process of implementing the method. This type of approach neglects the third stage of citizen participation in decision-making (*ex post*) and thus does not reduce the risk that citizens will reject the adopted programmes. It can, therefore, be inefficient and costly. This situation is particularly regrettable in a context in which public policy makers seek to assess the utility of public programmes but make little funding available for implementation of the evaluation. Indeed, the time and effort spent are transaction costs.

**- CACs and drawn, at random or volunteer: a new avenue to explore**

Although CACs have never been proposed as a tool to be used with the CVM, they seem to us to be best suited for use in productive *ex ante* and *ex post* considerations of needs and citizens' opinions. They can be used by a continuum of citizen volunteers in the co-construction of the public decision-making process. This leads to "*the recognition of citizens as experts in their daily lives*" (Sintomer, 2008: 121), through various and complementary forms of dialogue that enable them to understand the use and non-use values of public goods. Knowledge about non-use values concerns individuals who do not use the programme but may be interested in it. It may also concern individuals who are unfamiliar with the programme. These different types of individuals are able, nevertheless, to understand a programme's nature and scope by drawing on skills acquired in society. Knowledge of the use and non-use values of the policies evaluated can be enriched by discussions within CACs and with decision-makers: this can be used to identify individual preferences and to define the areas of intervention and political objectives to be pursued.

Public authorities have to accept that these committees sometimes pose a challenge to decisions they would have taken alone. This is a basic condition for social acceptance of public action conducted over the long term by public authorities, even though they are legitimate, democratically elected representatives of the population. Permanent comparisons between people's perceptions of their needs and the views of political decision-makers are essential for the proper implementation of public action. This is particularly true in situations in which decisions taken by politicians are (highly) disputed. From this point of view, the contributions of CACs are greater than those of other bodies, such as citizen juries and workshops, which are also supposed to represent civil society and make public action more acceptable. Indeed, the purpose of these latter bodies is to gather informed opinions as part of a process of exchanging information and arguments.

## **2.2 The value of linking CACs to the CVM: a combinatory effect**

The value added of CACs is that they make the CVM part of a joint approach to the construction of public action. Citizen participation by CACs can permit to resolve certain methodological biases of the CVM. Indeed, representative groups of citizens can find themselves involved continuously in that process, from the design phase to the final decision. As far as implementation of the CVM is concerned, this means that CACs are involved in the three stages of the valuation process leading to the final decision: *ex ante*, *in itinere* and *ex post*.

a) *Ex ante*, that is to say during the pre-survey phase in which hypothetical scenarios that provide the basis for evaluating the relevance of a programme or the production of public goods are

specified, CACs provide the public authorities with more detailed or previously missing information on citizens' preferences. What these citizens' groups bring to the table in this phase is their knowledge of existing public action programmes. They are also bodies able to scrutinise these programmes; on the basis of collegial discussions, they may gauge the need to renew or modify them.

They are also able to recommend new ones. Such well-substantiated recommendations serve then to clarify which of the programmes are to be chosen to undergo contingent valuation for the public authorities. In multilevel governance regimes, they constitute a solid, well-substantiated basis for the various levels of government to decide on the programmes that most deserve to undergo contingent valuation. After public authorities specified which programmes are to undergo contingent valuation (with explanations of the reasons why the views expressed upstream by CACs are considered or dismissed, in accordance with an ideal type reflecting best practices in transparency and trust building), CACs can be called on to analyse the hypothetical scenarios in the contingent valuation questionnaires. Their collective expertise brought to bear on the questionnaires compiled by experts in contingent valuation will help to improve them. The aim here is to ensure that the scenarios are relevant to citizens' needs, that they reflect their social aspirations and that the vocabulary used is completely comprehensible and does not offend their sensibilities. It is also essential to avoid any obstacles caused by poor comprehension by using the CACs as test groups in order to make any improvements that may be needed in order to render questionnaires compiled by experts in contingent valuation fully comprehensible to ordinary citizens; to be avoided, therefore, are 'technical expressions and particular turns of phrases that have to have been learnt and which, consequently, outsiders and lay persons are unlikely to know' (Portzig, 1962 : 219). Thus, the aim of this exercise is to prevent the CVM questioning from 'generating meaningless answers' (Terreaux and Brahic, 2009, p. 132). For this reason, a good understanding of the questionnaires and scenarios gives the survey greater credibility by remedying two of the method's three main methodological biases, which undermine the credibility of the results. The first bias is the difficulty individuals have in projecting themselves into a hypothetical scenario. Ami et Chanel (2009) explain that this difficulty stems from a 'lack of experience of and information about the good undergoing valuation' (49).

The second bias follows from the first: non-responses due to a lack of comprehension or interest on respondents' part and which often leads them to reply: 'I don't know, I don't understand' or 'I don't want to reply'. The result is to make the information gathered significantly less accurate, which reduces the validity of the valuation. The experts on the so-called NOAA panel (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration) (1993:129), whose studies of the CVM are authoritative, noted in their report that the reliability of the results is seriously undermined if non-response rates are high (for the questionnaire as a whole or the WTP).

b) During the *in itinere* phase which, in the traditional CVM framework, is that in which citizens are consulted through the administration of the questionnaires, CAC involvement is probably less crucial. Nevertheless, it has the advantage of enabling citizens to monitor the process in order to make sure that the survey is being conducted satisfactorily and is well understood. This monitoring is such that it can prevent the CVM's third well-known bias, the so-called interviewer bias that also undermines the validity of the results (Mitchell et Carson (1989; Bonnieux et al.,1995). Anxious to demonstrate their 'social desirability', interviewers often tend to present themselves in a favourable light to their interviewees. The latter's lack of information about the public good being evaluated further reinforces interviewers' power to influence. In order to counter this problem, CACs are able to intervene during the administration of the questionnaire by consulting interviewees in order to ensure that they understand the survey and that there is no interviewer bias; at a later stage, the CACs could possibly invalidate a survey if there have been significant

problems with the administration of the survey and, if necessary, suggest that the questionnaire and the hypothetical scenarios be amended in order a valid inquiry may be carried out.

c) In the final, *ex post*, phase of the valuation process, in which programmes are adopted or rejected in the light of the survey results, citizens' involvement is particularly crucial as part of an exercise in participatory democracy. The aim here is to reach final decisions that take due account of citizens' preferences.

While it falls to the authorities to take decisions, the objective is to maintain the capacity for collective interpretation concerning opportunities of implementing public action. CACs involvement in this phase is all the more beneficial since the results of the contingent valuations are often difficult for public decision-makers to interpret, particularly in multilevel regimes. Decision-makers react in different ways to the results depending on their political sensibilities, their areas of expertise and their regional positioning. In this regard, Bance et Chassy (2017) have pointed out that decision-makers run significant risks (particularly in terms of their re-election) if they take a final decision solely on the basis of the results of the CVM questionnaires. Some decision-makers may also find an opportunity in the results obtained to assert their own interests over those of their other public partners. These situations may lead to disagreement in the joint decision-making process. In this situation, CACs can be useful mediators. They can advise decision-makers on the potential political repercussions of the measures taken and on the current state of the programmes after evaluation. Citizens can, after all, be versatile and take up new positions when programmes are endorsed. Sheatsley and Hyman (1953) note in this regard that 'the acts of human beings are not determined solely by their opinions but also by powerful factors specific to each situation' (p. 508). Thus, media coverage of the projects and the alternatives opened up by the adoption of programmes can change opinions at the end of the valuation process. The feedback CACs provide for decision-makers can give rise to debates among decision-makers as to the value and purpose of public action and may lead them to update and revise the points of view that emerged from the contingent valuation. Although political decision-makers 'ultimately retain their power' (Prémont and Boisvert, 2003: 27), CACs play a role that is all the more useful since there is a multiplicity of 'leaders' and it is often necessary to negotiate a compromise between the positions held by the various levels of government.

The participatory approach makes it possible to explain iteratively the strengths and weaknesses of each point of view with evidence from detailed discussions with representatives of civil society in order to initiate changes on the basis of shared results. The fundamental purpose of CACs in the CVM process is to establish a close link between civil society and public decision-makers with a view to jointly managing public action. By observing and analysing public action and offering advice and making recommendations to the authorities that have a real influence on public decision-making, they work to have citizens' needs and interests taken into account in the development and implementation of public programmes and the production of public goods. From this ethical perspective, CACs must be representative of the populations affected by certain public actions; they must be suitably constituted and their members must be known and their presence accompanied by fruitful exchanges. However, they must be much more than mere spokespersons; they must be able to have a significant effect on decision-making processes in order to generate real value added. But is this participatory approach not utopian by the limits of its implementation?

### 3. Limitations of the CAC/CVM combination and future prospects

The limitations of CACs are related primarily to methodological issues and political obstacles to implementation. This diagnosis will lead us to propose recommendations for combining CACs with the CVM effectively.

#### 3.1 Methodological limitations and obstacles to the use of CACs in support of CVM

Implementation of the CVM/CAC combination suffers from two limitations. The first concerns the representativeness of the local citizens who make up the CACs. This results from the difficulties in mobilizing citizens to contribute to the evaluation of public policies. Despite the use of sophisticated tools designed to ensure representativeness, the recurrent criticism is only those with the greatest amount of spare time actually volunteer to take part.

This poses problems with regard to “*the representativeness of members (women, men, young people, seniors, nationals, foreigners)*” (Centres de Ressources Politique de la Ville : y aller par 4 chemins)<sup>3</sup>. Laquière (2009) also states that the people most likely to sit on these committees are those who have the time or are retired, have no children or are not economically active. He also notes that individuals representing voluntary associations tend to become involved in order to defend their personal interests or because they are very close politically to elected officials. In this case, CAC members are not representative of the population as a whole while exerting considerable influence on so-called general interest decision-making. A survey of citizen participation by the Association of City and Suburban Mayors with the mayors of communes (2014) found that it is difficult “*to mobilise the most vulnerable, the most marginalised or those in difficulties*”<sup>4</sup>. This situation calls into question the relevance of the use of CACs in combination with the CVM. At the *ex ante* stage, the CACs’ lack of representativeness adversely affects the relevance and proper understanding of the hypothetical scenarios proposed to the citizens surveyed. Thus, it is not possible to generalise to the entire population and the information gathered distorts the interpretation of citizens’ preferences as a basis for identifying the general interest. The second limitation concerns the internal functioning of CACs. Prémont and Boisvert (2003: 8) state that satisfactory citizen participation in any public consultation exercise is reliant on information “*which makes it possible to record citizens’ values and preference*”, conciliation “*between the different interest groups*” and appropriation “*by the population of the public services it uses and finances*”.

CACs have their limits in this regard. For want of transparency, the citizens involved in CACs often lack information and the mechanisms through which to comprehend the field covered by the policy to be evaluated and its effects on the population. Thus, as Résovilles (2017: 9) states, “the citizen councils of the Nantes metropolitan area are virtually unanimous in agreeing that they lack information on the choices and the way in which decisions are made”. This results, in particular, from the lack of regular dialogue between citizens and decision-makers on the CACs’ organisational, technical and decision-making operationality. Consequently, a poorly prepared citizens’ assessment in a CVM-related process provides too little information to acquire the knowledge required for an appropriate technical evaluation. And conciliation, which is based on the comparison of different assessments and negotiation with the aim of reaching an agreement is

---

<sup>3</sup> « Y aller par quatre chemins » speaks of the participation of the inhabitants in the popular districts. Website : <http://www.yallerparquatrechemins.fr>

<sup>4</sup> Survey conducted in February and March with 120 mayors of the Association having obtained 38 responses from mayors of suburban cities totalling more than one and a half million inhabitants. Website : <http://www.ville-et-banlieue.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/2014-PARTICIPATION-CITOYENNE-SYNTHESE.pdf>

also far from being guaranteed by the existence of CACs. They do not always have "*procedures that allow for the conciliation of different viewpoints, which is necessary for the proper conduct of consultations*" (Prémont and Boisvert, 2003, 14). In addition, policymakers are often not receptive to the positions advocated by CACs. These positions are ignored by policymakers for different reasons: political risks, a sense of mistrust of the tools used, defiance of citizen assessments or simply a political decision taken beforehand. Conciliation is inappropriate if "*strategic decisions have already been made and [where CACs] are used only to obtain popular support for a given project, without taking into account citizens' real concerns*" (Prémont and Boisvert, 2003, 15). The context then becomes one in which citizens are being manipulated or duped. These kinds of limitations profoundly undermine citizens' confidence in public policy-makers. And policy-makers are therefore less and less inclined to use these methods. However, recommendations can be made.

### **3.2 The conditions for the proper use of CACs in combination with the CVM**

In order for CACs and the CVM to be satisfactorily combined, several conditions must be met in accordance with the principles of CAC relevance, transparency and integrity.

a) The principle of CAC relevance means that they must be constituted in such a way as to match the groups within the population that they are supposed to represent while at the same time being endowed with use and non-use expertise that meets expectations. So, in the advisory councils of the citizens of the cities of Wallonie and, stipulating in the Code of Local Democracy and Decentralisation, it is appropriate "to hear any assembly of people, regardless of their age, charged by the Council to give an opinion on one or more specific issues". What is at stake here is not only their representativeness but also members' assiduousness in attending meetings and their availability over the long term despite personal constraints. To do this, it is important to encourage the presence of volunteer citizens to ensure real commitment. To guarantee the presence and engagement of citizens drawn, it may be advisable to call for candidates before proceeding to the draw. The field survey of the Réunion Region CAC<sup>5</sup> indeed shows that 63% of those interviewed consider that the call for candidates must precede the draw by lots. Remote consultations using information technology are possible in order to improve attendance. However, in order for there to be a process of continuous involvement in CACs and a genuine constructive dialogue between citizens and public decision-makers, regular face-to-face meetings in face are essential. The adoption of incentives to encourage attendance and participation may be useful, but of course the initial process of identifying relevant CACs members is essential. Wide-ranging calls for candidates and a selection process based on criteria that serve to identify representative actors and, above all, open to the use of tools for analysing choices and enabling direct consultation of citizens would be facilitating factors.

b) The second recommendation concerns the transparency of the citizen consultation. The objective here is to establish efficient functioning by introducing clear rules to make CACs operate effectively. The elected representatives of the commune of Digne-les-Bains deliberated in this perspective on the creation of a citizen advisory council in order to clarify the role of this council and the terms of organization and decision-making. These rules and the role of CACs must be fully known from the outset. This complete transparency should apply to the various stages of the process at work in support of the CVM. This requires perfect knowledge of what is expected from CACs. What power do they have to influence policy choices or the choice of scenarios? What leeway do they have to alter a decision? This preliminary transparency, which absolutely must apply to all subsequent stages of the process, serves to establish trust and to mobilise citizens

---

<sup>5</sup> Summary of the results of the consultation for the construction of the CCC of the Reunion region. Website: <https://capcitoyenreunion.re/blog/synthese-des-resultats-de-la-consultation-pour-la-construction-du-ccc>

effectively. The establishment of a “Board of Audit ”, responsible for ensuring that the proposals expressed by the CCC have retained by the Municipal Council and followed up on effect would, also strengthen citizens' confidence in public decision-makers (cf. Appendix 3: Feedback from a CAC in the city of Millau). This prevents the frustrations arising from feelings of having been duped. It establishes a contractual relationship based on ethical principles between CAC members and public decision-makers. CACs can play a more or less extended role in this regard. They may act as consultants whose recommendations the authorities are not obliged to implement. Conversely, they can be regarded as a key element in the co-construction of public policies through the sharing of knowledge and experience.

c) The third principle is that of integrity. The objective here is to make CACs into tools for citizen consultation within the CVM process that meet the expectations of democratic expression. It is not simply a question of specifying the timetable in advance (lifespan of the CACs, number of meetings, intervals between meetings etc.) but also of guaranteeing genuine citizen participation in all three stages of CVM implementation.

The National Steering Committee of the Citizens' Advisory Committees of Correctional Services in Canada states in their annual report (2014-2015) that it is necessary to “focus on the commitment of CCC members and the resolution of the retention problem” (p.10). It is also necessary in this perspective to ask CAC members *“what new means of civic expression they can devise in order to make their voices heard”* (Timmerman and Demoby, 2014: 1). These new means of citizen expression could be followed up in such a way as to enable everyone to understand why an idea put forward by a citizen has not been adopted. The status of those ideas that are adopted should be further enhanced by analysing how they helped to enrich the final decision. The integrity principle also makes it necessary to problematise the context of the contingent study by bringing decision-makers and citizens together to discuss, to undertake alternative assessments and to debate how to analyse and resolve problems by the most appropriate method, to analyse the public policy alternatives, to draw up hypothetical scenarios and to develop ways of administering the questionnaires and taking the final decision. Good understanding by everyone of their role in the processes at work is therefore essential. Indeed, as Katz and Kahn (1966) point out, role conflicts can result from the organizational, individual and interpersonal environment of each actor. These conflicts come from incompatibilities between two or more expectations and / or requests: the acquisition of one of them makes the acceptance or the realization of another one more difficult if not impossible. It is why, for CACs as ~~in the~~ for citizen juries ~~model~~, it might be worthwhile questioning expert witnesses in order to overcome the difficulties of understanding and to gather recommendations. However, in order to avoid any manipulation or influence, the presence of a neutral third party bridging the gap between the CAC and political decision-makers and acting as a mediator would seem to be necessary. Aballéa (2002) argues that to problematise is to try to make actors with divergent interests aware that positions can be continuously modified as the conciliation process proceeds.

The aim should also be to ensure that everyone is convinced that the results obtained collegially are such that they are able to disregard any personal reservations they may have had initially. This may be sufficient to take the CVM to another level altogether by locating it within a public decision-making process that seeks to transcend initially incompatible individual positions.

## Conclusion

This research shows that, in particular in a context of multilevel governance, public authorities have a great interest in making their decisions by combining the traditional tool of ex ante economic calculation, the CVM, with other participatory tools. ~~The difficulty of evaluating public policies in a multilevel governance regime using the traditional CVM approach has been highlighted in this article. this traditional~~ Indeed, because its fundamentally centralist approach, ~~of~~ the CVM comes up against significant methodological limitations. Citizens are little involved in the various stages of its implementation, which fundamentally reduces the method's relevance in a multilevel regime in which there is a particular desire to bring public decision-making closer to the citizens it is supposed to serve. The multiplicity of actors and the desire to involve them in the decision-making processes make it necessary to develop new ways of implementing evaluation processes.

Based on a review of field experiments and interviews, this article also shows, that the participative tools deployed today, such as citizen juries, workshops and CACs, the advantages of the latter are inherently superior for a combination with the CVM. That is true so much from a practical point of view than a theoretical one. ~~it has been shown that~~. CACs are able to provide useful information and consultation in order significantly to improve the effectiveness of the CVM evaluation process. ~~and that~~ They clearly differ in this respect from citizen juries and workshops, whose implementation processes prove to be too constrained, too restricted and often too technical.

However, the CAC/CVM combination is really effective only if certain methodological and political limitations are eliminated. The methodology outlined here is intended to enable CACs to identify in a sincere and thoughtful manner what citizens' preferences are through interactions between policymakers and citizens leading to the adoption or adaptation of public action programmes in a multilevel governance regime. For this to be the case, however, it is necessary to ensure that the CACs are truly representative, that they play an active role in supporting public-decision-making throughout the entire CVM evaluation process and that the principles, of relevance, transparency and integrity are applied. To achieve this will requires the existence of a genuine political will.

## References

- Aballéa, F. 2002. Régulation et intervention sociale. *in* Les espaces pertinents de la régulation sociale. *Cellule GRIS*, 9 : 5-13.
- Alvarez-Farizo, B., & Nick, H. 2002. Using conjoint analysis to quantify public preferences over the environmental impacts of wind farms an example from Spain. *Energy Policy*, 30: 107-116
- Ami, D., & Chanel, O. 2009. Vers un renouveau encore fragile des méthodes de préférences déclarées. *Economie et Statistique*, 42 : 47-51.
- Arrow, K-J. & al. 1993. *Report of the NOAA Panel on Contingent Valuation*. Federal Register 4601- 4614.
- Bailly, J-P. 1998. Prospective, débat, décision publique. *Journal Officiel*, 6: 1-123.
- Bance, P., & Chassy, A. 2017. The rollout of the multilevel governance system: a source of reworking the Contingent Valuation Method?. *Politics and Policy*, Issue (45.6).
- Bance, P., & Chassy, A. 2018. Citizen Advisory Committees: A Tool to Remedy the Shortcomings of the Contingent Valuation Method within the System of Multi-Level Governance. *International Journal of Public Administration*, 42: 685-695.
- Blondiaux, L. 1997. Ce que les sondages font à l'opinion publique. *Politix*, 10 : 117-136.
- Blondiaux, Loïc. 2008. *Le nouvel esprit de la démocratie : actualité de la démocratie participative*. Seuil, Paris.
- Bonnieux, F., & al. 1995. La Méthode d'Evaluation Contingente : application à la qualité des eaux littorales. *Economie & Prévision*, 117-118 : 89-106.
- Bourdieu, P. 1973. L'opinion publique n'existe pas. *Les Temps Modernes*, 318 : 1292-1309.
- Carson, R-T. 2011. *Contingent Valuation: A Comprehensive Bibliography and History*. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.
- Carson, R-T. 2012. Contingent Valuation: A Practical Alternative when Prices Aren't Available. *Journal of Economic Perspective*, 26 (4): 27-42.
- Chassy, A. 2011. Evaluation through the participatory approach: a remedy for the crisis in public services, *in* Bance, P., Bernier, L., (dir.), *Contemporary Crisis et Renewal of Public Action*. Towards the Emergence of a New Form of Regulation. Peter Lang, Bruxelles.
- Ciriacy-Wantrup, S-V. 1947. Capital Returns from Soil-Conservation Practices. *Journal of Farm Economics*, 29: 1181-1196.
- Claeys-Mekdade, C., & Vivien, F.D. 2003. Economie et démocratie dans le domaine de l'environnement : la méthode d'évaluation contingente en question, *in* H. Guillemain, H. Jorda, et M. Pouchol (dir.), *La démocratie et le marché*, Economie et Démocratie, L'Harmattan, Paris.
- Crosby, N. 1973. *Concerns for All, Political Science thesis*. University of Minnesota.
- Davis, R-K. 1963. Recreation planning as an economic problem. *Natural Resources Journal* 3 : 239-249.
- Diamond, P-A., & Jerry, A-H. 1993. On Contingent Valuation Measurement of Non-use. In Hausman, J., (Ed.), *Contingent Valuation: A Critical Assessment*. Amsterdam, North Holland Press, 3-38.



- Delebarre, M. 1998, « L'évaluation au cœur des enjeux de l'administration publique française », in *Pouvoirs locaux* : 105-107.
- Faburel, G., & al. 2000. Observation de l'acceptabilité institutionnelle et sociale d'une modalité d'expertise appliquée aux transports : la Méthode d'Evaluation Contingente. CEIL/PREDIT.
- Favre, P., & al. 2003. *Être gouverné, Études de cas en l'honneur de Jean Leca*. Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Paris.
- Flachaire, E., & Hollard, G. 2005. Une approche comportementale de l'évaluation contingente. *Revue Économique*, 57 : 315-329.
- FCPQ. 2009. La consultation : un devoir à faire ou un pouvoir à maîtriser, Bibliothèque nationale du Québec.
- FSC. *n.d.* Présentation des principes et bases de la méthodologie des « Ateliers Scénario ». Fondation Sciences Citoyennes.
- Gregory, R & Wellman K. 2001. Bringing stakeholder values into environmental policy choices: a community-based estuary case study, *Ecological Economics*, 39(1): 37-52.
- Habermas, J. 1992. *Faktizität und Geltung. Beiträge zur Diskurstheorie des Rechts und des demokratischen Rechtsstaates*. Francfort, Suhrkamp.
- Hausman, J. 2012. Contingent Valuation: From Dubious Hopeless. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*. 26 (4) : 43-56.
- James, R-F., & Russell. K-B. 2005. *Deliberation and Economic Valuation: National Park Management*. Alternative for Environmental Valuation (M.Getzner M., C.L., Spash, S.Stagl, eds), London Routledge : 225-243.
- Katz, D. & Kahn. R.L. (1966), *The social psychology of organizations*, Wiley.
- Lafont, C. 2017. Can Democracy be Deliberative and Participatory? The Democratic Case for Political Uses of Minipublics. *Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences*, 146 (3).
- Laquière, A. 2009. *Quelles solutions envisager pour réconcilier les citoyens avec la politique ?* in *La démocratie d'apparence*, Collectif Bérénice Tournafond, Paris, François-Xavier Guibert 2017.
- Luchini, S. 2002. De la singularité de la méthode d'évaluation contingente. *Économie et Statistique*, 357-358 : 141-152.
- Macmillan, D-C., & al. 2002. Valuing the non-market benefits of wild goose conservation: a comparison of interview and group-based approaches. *Ecological Economics*, 43 (1) : 49-59.
- Mignauw, T. 2016. *La contestation des grands projets et l'exercice de la démocratie : l'État stratège en question ?* in P. Bance (dir.), *Quel modèle d'État stratège en France ?* Presses Universitaires de Rouen et du Havre.
- Mitchell, R-C., & Carson, R-T. 1989. *Using Surveys to Value Public Goods: The Contingent Valuation Method*. Washington D.C: John Hopkins Press for the Resources for the Future, Baltimore.
- Porzig, W. 1962. Probleme, Methoden und Ergebnisse der modernen Sprachwissenschaft. In A. Francke, Suisse, Bern, München.

- Prémont, K and Boisvert, Y. 2003. *Les méthodes de consultation publique*. Laboratoire Ethique Publique, ENAP, Canada.
- Randall, A., Berry I., & Eastman, C. 1974. Bidding Games for Valuation of Aesthetic Environmental Improvements. *Journal of Environmental Economics and Management*, 1: 132-149.
- Rawls, J. 1971. *A theory of justice*. Harvard University Press.
- RésoVilles. 2017. Conseils de citoyens – les enjeux d’une réussite. *Contact ResOVilles : Émilie Sarrazin*.
- Sheatsley, P-B., & Hyman, H-H. 1953. Les enquêtes sur l’opinion publique et la prévision du comportement. *Bulletin International des Sciences Sociales*, V : 497-705.
- Sintomer, Y. 2008. Du savoir d’usage au métier de citoyen. *Raisons Politiques*, 3 : 115-133.
- Smith, G., & Wales. C. 1999. The Theory and Praticice of Citizen’s Juries. *Policy & Politics*, 27 (3) : 295-308.
- Spash, C-L. 2008. Deliberative Monetary Valuation and the Evidence for a New Value Theory. *Land Economics*, 84 (3) : 469-488.
- Terreaux, J-P., & Brahic, E. 2009. *Évaluation économique de la biodiversité*. Quae, Paris.
- Timmerman, V., & Debomy, D. 2014. *Comment l’Union Européenne communique-t-elle avec les citoyens ?* Notre Europe Institut Jacques Delors, Paris.
- Vergne, A. 2008. *Les jurys citoyens : une nouvelle chance pour la démocratie*. Les notes de la fondation Jean Jaurès, Paris.
- Voltaire, L., & al. 2011 Effet d’une taxe et d’un droit d’entrée sur les consentements à payer des touristes pour de nouvelles réserves naturelles dans le golfe du Morbihan. *Revue études en Agriculture et Environnement*, 92 (2) : 183-209.
- Ward, H. 1999. Citizen’s juries and valuing the environment: A proposal. *Environmental Politics*, 8 (2): 75-96.

## **Appendix 1: Feedback from a Citizen Jury (CJ) within the City of Villeurbanne (France) – 22 000 inhabitants**

**Audited Body:** City of Villeurbanne (Decision-making body) – CCO - Laboratoire d’Innovation Sociale et Culturelle (Social and Cultural Innovation Laboratory)

**Project concerned:** "Participation and consultation" component of the "Bienvenue à Villeurbanne" (Welcome in Villeurbanne) mission, including the creation and support of the work of a citizen jury to make concrete proposals for the reception of migrants, the setting up of a documenting website and the capitalization of the whole process.

**Interview:** Nathalie Tibolla, in charge of Community life and Concertation at the CCO, project manager for the implementation of the "Participation and concertation" component; Fernanda Leite, director of the CCO, resource person on the process and facilitator; Lison Leneveler, doctoral student in public law at the University of Grenoble Alpes, resident in Rize, City of Villeurbanne, resource person and coordinator of the global mission "Welcoming in Villeurbanne".

**Facilitator of the CJ:** the CCO, anchored in the territory of the Lyon metropolis for more than 55 years. Place of daily emergence of new initiatives that strengthen the capacity to act, think and dream of society, the CCO aims to offer a cultural space of freedom that cultivates the capacities of all people to take their place in society. It is also a breeding ground for collective initiatives and meetings promoting intercultural dialogue.

**(1) Explain the choice of the CJ tool in the organization?** The CJ tool was chosen for several reasons: an innovative tool little used in France; a tool to involve residents in public decision-making. The choice of this tool takes into account the challenges of exercising local citizenship for the "Welcome to Villeurbanne" mission. The CJ's objective was to formulate shared responses in order to enrich public policies and fuel collective, local, civic and associative dynamics.

**(2) Who is the sponsor of the choice of tool?** On the proposal of the head of the mission, and in consultation with the Mayor, it was decided to focus on this tool for its innovative and participative nature. The constitution of the citizen jury and the animation of its work were entrusted to the CCO.

**(3) What is the object of the CJ implementation process?** The "Welcome to Villeurbanne" mission set out to initiate reflection and create momentum around the subject of welcoming migrants. To achieve this, we have chosen to mobilize two sources: that of knowledge and that of active citizenship "Citizen Jury"; citizens had already been made aware of the issue of migration and access to rights.

**(4) Is the subject chosen by the sponsor or the jurors?** No, the jurors did not decide on the public policy to be studied. The mayor decided the subject. This one comes from a municipal political will.

**(5) What are the arrangements for setting up (duration, choice of jurors, meeting place, etc.)?** The work of the jury began on September 22, 2018 and was transmitted to the mayor on February 8, 2019 with the submission of a report: "Proposals for actions for a Hospitable City". After several exchange sessions, the jury formulated opinions and proposals to meet the challenges of reception. The citizens' jury was made up of voluntary citizens drawn from lots, drawn from all the districts of the city while taking care of the parity (14 women and 12 men) as well as the diversity of the ages. The members of the jury all received compensation, based on the compensation rate for voluntary service (€ 7.07 / hour) so that financial resources are not an obstacle to civic engagement.

The functioning of this participative space was guaranteed by a charter, binding on each member, promoting the diversity of points of view while respecting everyone and the law.

**(6) What are the communication and monitoring methods?** A participative digital platform (<https://accueillir-villeurbanne.fr/>) was created documenting and capitalizing on the whole process with a forum. It contains a box of ideas, resources and knowledge tools on the migration issue and the work of the Jury: productions, reports, filmed sequences, reports... A day of design-thinking was also organized, this creative working method is based on a dynamic of animation by which the participants respond to a problem of start by imagining, then prototyping and experimenting with concrete and innovative proposals on the subject "Hospital Villeurbanne". Each participant puts his knowledge and experience for the analysis of a scenario. Participants have the most varied profiles possible to ensure diversity of views, approaches and ideas. The work of each team is organized as a challenge.

**(7) What are the decision-making procedures?** The decisions were made mainly using the consent method, a process of developing a decision based on the sharing of arguments. The vote was used to prioritize the Jury's proposals without excluding some of them and establishing the structure of the report. The presence of specialized experts (social scientists, field workers, associations, engaged collectives) and the continuous support of a doctoral student in public law helped to frame the work to ensure the relevance and consistency of action proposals. Has been adapted the speech of each expert, so that it was useful and appreciated by the jurors. The independence of the CCO vis-à-vis the political power finally made it possible to guard against political instrumentalization, which the Mayor and his Municipal Council wanted to avoid. The report was officially submitted to the Mayor by the jurors. After a feasibility study by the municipal services, the Mayor decided to prioritize four proposals implemented in the short term, including the opening of a reception area with showers. Other proposals will be studied for a longer term implementation.

**(8) What are the strengths of CJ?** Three advantages have been highlighted. The first has been "to make concrete proposals from a hospitable city towards those who come from elsewhere". This objective has been apprehended and enriched by the jurors. The second asset is the inclusive dimension since the approach of the citizen jury allowed a co-construction with a group of citizens and other actors (municipal services, associations, migrants themselves...). The third asset is the commitment of citizens, their empowerment on a subject of public interest and their active implication regardless of their origins and status. A letter sent to the inhabitants drawn by lot to propose them participation in the Jury indicated thus: "I am of foreign origin, I have lived in 40 years in Villeurbanne, this is the first time that I have received a letter which tells me and makes me feel that I am a citizen of the city". The whole process allows citizen jurors to participate in the development of public policies. It makes each citizen a resource person in the territory.

**(9) What are the disadvantages of CJ?** Rather than disadvantages, points of attention have been highlighted. The first concerns the political calendar and the time allotted. The collective process takes time while the political calendar is fixed, which can be an obstacle to co-construction. The second point of attention is that the establishment of citizen juries requires significant human resources for the development, preparation, animation and monitoring of the process. The success of the action was made possible by the investment of CCO employees, but also of its volunteers and the doctoral student accompanying the project.

**(10) What are the organizational impacts of CJ?** The experience of this first Citizen Jury in the commune of Villeurbanne has made it possible to highlight a common diagnosis and a convergence of views between elected officials, municipal services and citizens. It has generated a shared awareness of the need to pursue this type of participatory approach on other transversal

subjects relating to the general interest in order to contribute to the implementation of public policies.

**(11) What could be recommendations to improve the implementation of CJ?** The main recommendation is to properly frame the order for the Jury and that the sponsors think well upstream of the follow-up that will be given to the work: operational implementation of proposals, even extension of citizen participation and in particular of the members of the jury in the implementation of actions, more effects of the opening of this type of proceeding on other subjects of public interest.

**(12) In your opinion, can the CJ tool be applied in public decision making to involve decision makers and citizens?** The CJ is an important citizen experiment of a participative tool. It is a good tool in the construction of public decision bringing together citizens and elected officials.

## **Appendix 2 : Workshop feedback within the Schneider Electric company (France)**

**Audited Body:** Schneider Electric - Global specialist in energy management and automation (the management of the company).

Interview : Laurent Chantoiseau – Lean manufacturing Master

**(1) Explain the choice of the Workshop tool in the organization?** The choice of workshop is directly linked to the Kaizen methodology and to lean manufacturing methodologies. In lean manufacturing, one of the pillars is the participation of operational staff in the transformation of their work tools. They are the best to describe, explain, what happens on the "shopfloor" and during the transformation of means, organization or manufacturing process. They are part of the working group to make it more effective. The idea of the workshop is therefore to bring together different operational people, methodists, quality specialists... in order to define together the best solution to answer a problem.

**(2) Who is the sponsor of the choice of tool?** There is no sponsor as such, this tool is part of our working methodology.

**(3) What is the object of the Workshop implementation process?** There is not really a process as stated above.

**(4) Is the subject chosen by the sponsor or the jurors?** The sponsor chooses the subject in order to work on improving the organization.

**(5) What are the arrangements for setting up (duration, choice of jurors, meeting place, etc.)?** This is described in the project charter of the site; generally the concept of planning is defined from the start via a DMAIC type process (Define, Measure, Analyze, Innovate and Control); the project group also gives the representatives of each of the departments of a factory: Production, Methods, Quality, Logistics and HR. The meetings when it is a field action takes place on the shopfloor.

**(6) What are the communication and monitoring methods?** Two types of communication take place: if it is a structuring subject, global communication and follow-up are carried out on the site; if the effects only affect a sector or a production line, a communication is made but without concerning the entire site.

**(7) What are the decision-making procedures?** Autonomy at the level of the actors, knowing that the financial part is always validated by the factory director.

**(8) What are the strengths of Workshop?** Empowerment of people, advantage of brainstorming, pooling of everyone's constraints.

**(9) What are the disadvantages of Workshop?** If a "soft" consensus or a "soft" solution is found, this will not necessarily respond to the optimum of the solution to make the industrial site more efficient.

**(10) What are the organizational impacts of Workshop?** The impact is generally to make available resources (human or material), what must be planned in order to avoid loss of productivity, quality, level of service for our customers.

**(11) What could be recommendations to improve the implementation of Workshop?** Global definition and validation of the project charter by a sponsor.

**(12) In your opinion, can the Workshop tool be applied in public decision making to involve decision makers and citizens?** No, we must not forget the amount of education required to set up Workshops. A company like Schneider Electric has implemented Lean management for more than 10 years, and at the same time set up Workshops. To do this, all staff had to be trained on these methodologies; this is one of the obstacles to this use. On the other hand, in an industrial site, there is also a hierarchy which allows that, in case of unprofessional behavior (in relation to the Workshop), one corrects it. Finally, in the Workshops in companies the scope of change is defined and weaker than a global transformation.

### **Appendix 3: Citizen Advisory Committees (CAC) feedback within the City of Millau (France) – 22 000 inhabitants**

**Audited Body:** City of Millau (Political body)

**Project concerned:** "Sustainable Development" component - Soft mobility

**Interview :** Laurent Drajkowki (Director of Cabinet) under cover of the Mayor Christophe Saint-Pierre

**(1) Explain the choice of the CAC tool in the organization?** The choice of this tool by the municipality stems from the desire to do politics differently. The idea is to take into account the wishes and assessments of the residents of the town. The demonstration of "Gilets Jaunes" (Yellow Jackets, French social movement of unorganized protest against political decisions) in 2018-19 confirmed the need to introduce this type of tool to guide the choices of the municipality. The CAC must become an aid to public decision-making but not a counterpower. He does not have the right to vote; it represents the citizens. Citizen common sense is expected by a "Consultative" approach. Elected officials retain their power to vote.

**(2) Who is the sponsor of the choice of tool?** The Mayor and his City Council are the initiators of this municipal tool.

**(3) What is the object of the CAC implementation process?** The first subject proposed after the installation of the CAC was that of soft mobility and this in connection with sustainable development. This is a topical and important subject for elected municipal officials.

**(4) Is the subject chosen by the sponsor or the participants?** The subject was chosen by the Mayor and proposed to the CAC. From a territorial diagnosis on mobility carried out by the Community of Communes "Millau Grand Causses", the citizens of the CAC were invited to reflect and interact on concrete proposals for the implementation of soft mobility in the municipality.

**(5) What are the arrangements for setting up (duration, choice of jurors, meeting place, etc.)?** The CAC was installed in September 2019. The most difficult was to ensure the representativeness of this body. The CAC is made up of 82 citizens of the municipality. 13 elected municipal officials

sit on this council. Three colleges were set up: the first is made up of 34 people who are, above all, volunteer, correspondents from quarters; the second college is made up of 21 people representing sports and cultural associations; finally, the third college is made up of 14 people drawn at random from the electoral list. The CAC meets outside the town hall premises so as not to mix the municipal body and the citizen body. Indeed, the municipal body is governed by law, it is therefore important to separate the two bodies well to allow everyone to have their place and legitimacy. Several meetings were organized following the launch of CAC: an installation meeting (September 2019), a conciliation meeting (November 2019) and a meeting of rendering by college of the proposals (December 2019).

**(6) What are the communication and monitoring methods?** The first installation meeting was chaired by the Mayor of the Municipality in order to present the citizen approach but also the internal regulations. This last one gives the composition of the CAC but also the rules for consultation on public decision-making. The media participate in each session in order to communicate on the importance of the proposals made and the issues in decision support. A report is sent to all participants at the end of the meeting. When the proposals were returned, a satisfaction questionnaire was given to the members of the CAC to express opinions on the functioning of this council.

**(7) What are the decision-making procedures?** The decision remains at the discretion of the elected officials. However, each college must express proposals which are then sent to elected officials. The proposals are studied by the municipal services to be sure the technical but above all financial feasibility. The viable proposals are then the subject of deliberation in the Municipal Council. It is important to specify that the proposals of the three colleges are not the subject of a consensual synthesis; each college is free to give its proposals under the aegis of a rapporteur appointed to respect the principle of democracy. Only consensual positions are adopted by the Mayor and the Municipal Council.

**(8) What are the strengths of CAC ?** Three assets were highlighted: citizen consultation is an essential tool; it brings a democratic impetus (each person can express himself whether or not agree); it is a decision support tool for public decision makers.

**(9) What are the disadvantages of CAC ?** Three drawbacks were highlighted: the difficulty of mobilizing citizens into this approach (50% of the workforce present in each college, and citizens drawn by lot refusing to engage in the CAC); the negative reactions saying that it is a political tool, not a citizen tool in the political sphere, and created for electoral reasons; all the expressed proposals are not accepted, which can cause dissatisfaction among the members of the CAC.

**(10) What are the organizational impacts of CAC?** The awareness of the need to do politics differently and to change the political paradigm; to be more listening...

**(11) What could be recommendations to improve the implementation of CAC?** Maintaining momentum by organizing many more meetings is essential to get to know each other better: the long-term idea is that the CAC can take initiatives and therefore self-organize in the meeting schedule. The public authorities must intervene but as a reinforcement, that is to say, materially helping these meetings. Finally, it could be interesting to create an "Audit Council" to ensure that the proposals expressed by the CCC, retained by the Municipal Council, have been followed up. This is about building trust between public decision-makers and citizens.

**(12) In your opinion, can the CAC tool be applied in public decision making to involve decision makers and citizens?** Within the municipality, we are convinced of the merits of this approach. In Millau, the inhabitants are very involved in municipal life. This tool is a way to better associate them with the decisions taken by the Mayor and his Municipal Council.