Scoring Rules and Preference Restrictions: The Strong Borda Paradox Revisited

Abstract : For a given voting situation, the Strong Borda Paradox occurs when a Condorcet loser exists and is elected. A Condorcet loser is a candidate that loses all his pairwise comparisons. In three-candidate elections, we use an analytical approach to find out, the range of all the scoring rules that can exhibit the Strong Borda Paradox under some well-known preference restrictions and we describe all the scenarios with respect to the rank of the Condorcet loser in the collective rankings. Using the parameterized Barvinok’s algorithm, we provide a simplified representation of the likelihood of the Strong Borda Paradox for the Plurality rule and the Antiplurality rule (given the size of the electorate) with the impartial and anonymous culture condition for each type of restriction.
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Article dans une revue
Revue d Economie Politique, Editions Dalloz, 2017, 127 (3), pp.375-395. 〈10.3917/redp.273.0375〉
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https://hal.univ-antilles.fr/hal-01631180
Contributeur : Eric Kamwa <>
Soumis le : mercredi 8 novembre 2017 - 18:11:24
Dernière modification le : dimanche 14 janvier 2018 - 13:03:10

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Eric Kamwa, Fabrice Valognes. Scoring Rules and Preference Restrictions: The Strong Borda Paradox Revisited. Revue d Economie Politique, Editions Dalloz, 2017, 127 (3), pp.375-395. 〈10.3917/redp.273.0375〉. 〈hal-01631180〉

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