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Journal Articles Revue d'économie politique Year : 2017

Scoring Rules and Preference Restrictions: The Strong Borda Paradox Revisited

Abstract

For a given voting situation, the Strong Borda Paradox occurs when a Condorcet loser exists and is elected. A Condorcet loser is a candidate that loses all his pairwise comparisons. In three-candidate elections, we use an analytical approach to find out, the range of all the scoring rules that can exhibit the Strong Borda Paradox under some well-known preference restrictions and we describe all the scenarios with respect to the rank of the Condorcet loser in the collective rankings. Using the parameterized Barvinok’s algorithm, we provide a simplified representation of the likelihood of the Strong Borda Paradox for the Plurality rule and the Antiplurality rule (given the size of the electorate) with the impartial and anonymous culture condition for each type of restriction.
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Dates and versions

hal-01631180 , version 1 (27-06-2019)

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Eric Kamwa, Fabrice Valognes. Scoring Rules and Preference Restrictions: The Strong Borda Paradox Revisited. Revue d'économie politique, 2017, 127 (3), pp.375-395. ⟨10.3917/redp.273.0375⟩. ⟨hal-01631180⟩
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