Skip to Main content Skip to Navigation
Preprints, Working Papers, ...

Condorcet Efficiency of the Preference Approval Voting and the Probability of Selecting the Condorcet Loser

Abstract : Under Approval Voting (AV), each voter just distinguishes the candidates he approves of from those appearing as unacceptable. The Preference Approval Voting (PAV) is a hybrid version of the approval voting first introduced by Brams and Sanver (2009). Under PAV, each voter ranks all the candidates and then indicates the ones he approves. In this paper, we provide analytical representations for the probability that PAV elects the Condorcet winner when she exists in three-candidate elections with large electorates. We also provide analytical representations for the probability that PAV elects the Condorcet loser. We perform our analysis by assuming the assumption of the Extended Impartial Culture. This analysis allows us to measure at which extend, PAV performs better than AV both on the propensity of electing the Condorcet loser and on that of the non-election of the Condorcet loser.
Document type :
Preprints, Working Papers, ...
Complete list of metadata

Cited literature [24 references]  Display  Hide  Download

https://hal.univ-antilles.fr/hal-01786121
Contributor : Eric Kamwa Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Saturday, May 5, 2018 - 6:51:24 AM
Last modification on : Thursday, December 6, 2018 - 1:21:31 AM
Long-term archiving on: : Monday, September 24, 2018 - 11:53:27 AM

File

PAV.pdf
Files produced by the author(s)

Identifiers

  • HAL Id : hal-01786121, version 1

Citation

Eric Kamwa. Condorcet Efficiency of the Preference Approval Voting and the Probability of Selecting the Condorcet Loser. 2018. ⟨hal-01786121v1⟩

Share

Metrics

Record views

40

Files downloads

285