The Condorcet Efficiency of the Preference Approval Voting and the Probability of Selecting the Condorcet Loser

Abstract : Under Approval Voting (AV), each voter just distinguishes the candidates he approves of from those appearing as unacceptable. The Preference Approval Voting (PAV) is a hybrid version of the approval voting first introduced by Brams and Sanver (2009). Under PAV, each voter ranks all the candidates and then indicates the ones he approves. In this paper, we provide analytical representations for the probability that PAV elects the Condorcet winner when she exists in three-candidate elections with large electorates. We also provide analytical representations for the probability that PAV elects the Condorcet loser. We perform our analysis by assuming the assumption of the Extended Impartial Culture. This analysis allows us to measure at which extend, PAV performs better than AV both on the propensity of electing the Condorcet loser and on that of the non-election of the Condorcet loser.
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https://hal.univ-antilles.fr/hal-01786121
Contributor : Eric Kamwa <>
Submitted on : Thursday, November 29, 2018 - 2:36:23 AM
Last modification on : Tuesday, June 25, 2019 - 3:00:49 PM

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Eric Kamwa. The Condorcet Efficiency of the Preference Approval Voting and the Probability of Selecting the Condorcet Loser. Theory and Decision, Springer Verlag, In press. ⟨hal-01786121v2⟩

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