The Condorcet Efficiency of the Preference Approval Voting and the Probability of Selecting the Condorcet Loser - Université des Antilles Access content directly
Journal Articles Theory and Decision Year : 2019

The Condorcet Efficiency of the Preference Approval Voting and the Probability of Selecting the Condorcet Loser

Eric Kamwa

Abstract

Under Approval Voting (AV), each voter just distinguishes the candidates he approves of from those appearing as unacceptable. The Preference Approval Voting (PAV) is a hybrid version of the approval voting first introduced by Brams and Sanver (2009). Under PAV, each voter ranks all the candidates and then indicates the ones he approves. In this paper, we provide analytical representations for the probability that PAV elects the Condorcet winner when she exists in three-candidate elections with large electorates. We also provide analytical representations for the probability that PAV elects the Condorcet loser. We perform our analysis by assuming the assumption of the Extended Impartial Culture. This analysis allows us to measure at which extend, PAV performs better than AV both on the propensity of electing the Condorcet loser and on that of the non-election of the Condorcet loser.
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Dates and versions

hal-01786121 , version 1 (05-05-2018)
hal-01786121 , version 2 (29-11-2018)

Identifiers

  • HAL Id : hal-01786121 , version 2

Cite

Eric Kamwa. The Condorcet Efficiency of the Preference Approval Voting and the Probability of Selecting the Condorcet Loser. Theory and Decision, 2019, 87 (3), pp.299-320. ⟨hal-01786121v2⟩
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